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Introduction: Priming Hong Kong 
Prior to the Umbrella Movement, there was little reason for people who were not from Hong Kong to 
care much about its politics, unless, of course, one were a devoted reader of The Economist, which did 
cover Hong Kong as a former British colony. Alas, my experience in the academy corroborates the 
former sentiment: when I began studying Christian involvement in Hong Kong’s politics in the late 
2000s, nobody was interested. “You have to study Christianity in China,” one advisor said, “because 
that’s where the jobs are.” The growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially the 
explosion of Christianity in China, was what people wanted to talk about. The fascination was tied to 
the economic spectacle of China’s spectacular urban landscapes, the political force of China’s 
increasing influence on international relations, the social impact of Chinese immigration to Anglo-
American metropolises.1 Indeed, with the recent spate of church buildings being demolished in 
Wenzhou and crosses being taken down in Zhejiang Province, China proper is still the only thing in 
the Greater China region that everyone wants to talk about. In this context, Christianity was 
fascinating because it told the story of China’s human rights record as well as missionary impulses 
still alive and well in the West.2 Another faculty committee member told me: “I know people who go 
over to China and go through networks in Hong Kong. You should follow them on a missions trip and 
do an ethnography on them.” Hong Kong, it turns out, was only interesting as it was tied to doing 
research on China proper. The local politics of Hong Kong and the engagement of Christians with 
them were not on my Anglo-American advisors’ radar screens. When I finally did get myself over to 
Hong Kong in 2010, people there confirmed to me that, as an Asian American, I was ill equipped to 
study China and Hong Kong’s relations with the motherland. Indeed, theologians and social scientists 
in Hong Kong were already studying Christianity in China, and church leaders were getting heavily 
involved in various kinds of missionary projects.3 They told me to go home. 
Things certainly have changed. The 2014 protests for democracy in Hong Kong have catapulted the 
local identity politics of Hong Kong people to the attention of the international media—and by 
extension, to my academic colleagues.4 Of course, the Hong Kong protests, known as the Umbrella 
Movement because the protesters brought umbrellas to defend themselves against police brutality, are 
still in many ways connected to Hong Kong-PRC relations; the protesters, after all, want “genuine 
universal suffrage” as opposed to puppet candidates vetted by Beijing. Occupying roads near key 
political and economic sites in Hong Kong from September 28 to December 15, 2014, the Hong Kong 
protesters argued that ordinary residents of Hong Kong, not an oligarchy, should determine the 
political future of the city. But the local identity politics of Hong Kong people have not been on the 
academic radar screen since the 1997 handover, and because of that, most English-language 
commentators on the Umbrella Movement seem only competent to discuss them within a PRC 
framework, while hinting that what Hong Kong people really want is political freedom and the 
expression of a vaguely local Hong Kong identity whose difference from other ethnic Chinese 
sensibilities eluded the white Western mind. 
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Fortunately, I only half-listened to my advisors. After being told to go home, my advisors and I 
concocted a new project to study how Cantonese-speaking Christians on the so-called Pacific Rim 
engaged their public spheres.5 I included Hong Kong in this project as a counterweight to claims in 
Vancouver and San Francisco that Cantonese-speaking migrants were importing their socially 
conservative religious homeland politics to secular societies in North America. Not only did I find in 
2012 that these charges were patently unfounded, but the project yielded data on the ongoing 
development of Christians’ involvement in democratic activism in Hong Kong. While most people in 
North America still wanted only to talk about the growth of China, I followed the incremental build-
up in Hong Kong from the contentious Fourth Chief Executive elections and the National and Moral 
Education controversy in 2012 to the Occupy Central with Love and Peace movement in 2013–2014 
to the 2014 Umbrella Movement. As the Hong Kong protests exploded across the international press 
after the exercise of police brutality on September 28, 2014, journalists picked up on primers I wrote 
on my blog because my research, contrary to the focus that I had been advised to take on Christianity 
and China, is really about Christians in Hong Kong.6  
This is all to say that a primer on Hong Kong is necessary before getting to the theological reflections. 
If our readers are not even aware of the basic political, economic, and social affairs of Hong Kong, the 
Umbrella Movement’s calls for “genuine universal suffrage,” “civil nomination,” and even “Hong 
Kong autonomy” will sound like vague ideological slogans, hardly a convincing way to conduct a 
protest, let alone be worth sustained theological reflection. We must understand what exactly Hong 
Kong’s democracy movement is demanding via this particular form of universal suffrage. Why are 
they demanding, of all things, “democracy,” an aim that is simultaneously noble (if one were to look 
at it positively) and conceptually vacuous (if one were to wax negatively critical)? What would 
“genuine universal suffrage” actually accomplish in material terms in Hong Kong? What exactly is 
the problem with the Hong Kong government that motivated them to come out and protest in the first 
place? Why are they so upset about Hong Kong being controlled by the central government in 
Beijing? Is not Hong Kong part of China? Why can’t people of ethnic Chinese origin all just get 
along? Are the protesters’ demands reasonable, or do the protests revolve around vague ideological 
fantasies with no real political content? Why exactly is all of this theological, and what business do 
theologians actually have in reflecting on the Umbrella Movement? 
In this primer, I hope to clarify many of these questions by surveying Hong Kong’s political apparatus 
and the deep embeddedness of Christians in both reinforcing and critiquing the system. In so doing, I 
follow the model of sociologist Craig Calhoun’s analysis of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, dividing his 
book between a lengthy blow-by-blow account of the demonstrations in the first part and then a 
theme-by-theme social scientific discussion in a second part.7 Similarly, I have written this chapter as 
an attempt at a comprehensive survey of Hong Kong politics before calling on local theologians to 
reflect on the Umbrella Movement. Following the see-judge-act method, we cannot judge or act 
unless we know at what we are looking. This primer is thus an invitation to see Hong Kong with an 
aim to understand the politics that led to the Umbrella Movement and that motivates our theological 
reflections. 
Placing the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Before we reflect on the Umbrella Movement itself, we need some legal and political definitions. This 
is because the demands of the 2014 protesters revolve around “universal suffrage,” the right of every 
Hong Kong citizen to vote, which the UK, the post-handover Hong Kong government, and the PRC 
had promised would be gradually implemented after the handover. 
Since the early 1990s, there have been insinuations that neither the local nor the central governments 
have intended to honor their on-the-record assurances about universal suffrage. As Democratic Party 
founder Martin Lee Chu-ming insinuated in 1991, the failure of then-UK Prime Minister John Major 
to discuss the implementation of democracy in Hong Kong during his 1991 visit indicated that even 
the UK was insincere about democratic governance in Hong Kong after 1997. Speaking to the Los 
Angeles Times, Lee quipped that the claim that democracy could be implemented gradually was a red 
herring: “I wonder how many times throughout history have unelected kings and despots repeated this 
pretext to deny democratic rights to their subjects!”8 Claiming that Beijing has systematically eroded 
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Hong Kong’s political autonomy, the 2014 protesters demand “genuine universal suffrage” within a 
system of “civil nomination,” which means that the residents of Hong Kong should have the right to 
directly nominate and vote for government representatives of their own choosing. Over the 79-day 
occupation in Hong Kong, the government rebutted that the demonstrators had misinterpreted these 
legal promises and that their demands failed to sufficiently respect Chinese sovereignty over Hong 
Kong. Calling into question the political autonomy of Hong Kong, these rebuttals referred to the 
interpretations of Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, Basic Law, by the PRC’s National People’s 
Congress’s Standing Committee (NPCSC), the 150-person legislative committee that is convened 
between the annual plenary sessions of the full nearly 3000-person National People’s Congress and 
that has the right to interpret the law. 
Because the Umbrella Movement is at heart a debate over how different political factions understand 
the legal framework of democracy in Hong Kong, we must first understand the political apparatus in 
which the demonstrations took place before we can even talk about what happened during the 2014 
protests, much less attempt theological reflection. We will begin by probing the origins of the “one 
country, two systems” framework in Hong Kong and its relation to universal suffrage. We will then 
trace the origins of democratic activism in this legal apparatus by examining the practices of elections 
and political agency for the Legislative Council, the Chief Executive, and the Court of Final Appeal. 
As we shall see, this primer will lay the groundwork for theological reflection on the Umbrella 
Movement because what the 2014 protests are ultimately about is a reform of the state’s political 
structure. 
“Gradual and Orderly Progress”: Universal Suffrage and the Legal Apparatus of “One 
Country, Two Systems” 
Between 1842 and 1997, Hong Kong was a colony in the nineteenth-century British Empire; since 
1997, Hong Kong has been a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC, a region that is under 
Chinese sovereignty but operates under a different political apparatus and economic system. While 
British companies had participated in regular trading activities in South China, Beijing’s tightening 
controls on British trading practices, including the importation of the opium narcotic, resulted in the 
First Opium War from 1832 to 1842. Emerging victorious after a show of naval power in the South 
Chinese Pearl River Delta, one of the major concessions the British extracted from China in the 
ensuing Treaty of Nanking was the cession of Hong Kong Island to the British Empire.9 In 1860, the 
Second Opium War resulted in the British annexing Kowloon Peninsula just north of the island. 
Hong Kong came under PRC sovereignty in 1997 in a “one country, two systems” framework. In 
1898, the British had successfully applied for a 99-year lease of sovereignty through Lantau Island 
and the New Territories north of Kowloon with a border at Shenzhen. The extension’s expiry in 1997 
triggered negotiations between the UK and the PRC about the status of Hong Kong. In 1979, Hong 
Kong’s colonial governor, Murray MacLehose, visited Beijing, where he learned that the PRC’s 
intentions were not only to go along with the historic Qing Dynasty’s agreement to return the rural 
New Territories, but to take the entire territory across the urban areas of Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon as well—and by force, if necessary. To stave off any unnecessary geopolitical tensions 
between the UK and the PRC, then-UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and then-PRC Premier 
Zhao Ziyang met for two years between 1982 and 1984 in Beijing to negotiate the handover’s 
conditions. The consensus that they reached was that that the PRC would promise to maintain the 
current political and economic order in Hong Kong for 50 years after 1997 and that the UK would 
hold the PRC to that commitment. 
These talks resulted in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, a 
document that codified the transfer of sovereignty on July 1, 1997. Signed by both Thatcher and Zhao, 
the agreement was that Hong Kong would enjoy “a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and 
defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government” (3.2), and that this 
situation would “remain unchanged for 50 years” (3.12). What this meant was that despite Hong 
Kong’s handover to Chinese sovereignty after the 1997 handover, the laws would remain unchanged, 
the structure of the state would remain the same, the separate legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches would stay separate, the government would still be populated by “local inhabitants” (3.4), 
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and the city would continue to be an “international financial centre” (3.6–3.9). At the time, the PRC’s 
paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, defined this policy as the practice of “one country, two systems”: 
Hong Kong would come under the territorial sovereignty of the one country (the PRC), but the PRC 
and the SAR would have two systems. In this way, Hong Kong would remain the city that it was 
under British colonial rule, even anticipating that the correction of “mistakes” from the Mao era in 
Chinese socialism would put the motherland “in line with the principle of proceeding from reality and 
seeking truth from facts.”10  
Indeed, Deng had originally proposed this arrangement as the possible conditions for Taiwan’s 
reunification with the PRC in 1979; with Hong Kong, Deng’s framework could be put to the test. 
“One country, two systems” was altogether a novel idea, after all. It would have been anathema in the 
Mao era of detaching the PRC from the global economy to create a communist utopia in China. 
However, Deng had opened the PRC to participation in international commerce under the policy 
framework of “market socialism,” which is to say that the PRC is technically a “Communist” nation-
state because it is a one-party state governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but since 
Deng’s rise to leadership in the late 1970s, its political and economic practices should more properly 
be understood as a market system that is under the command of Beijing’s Central Government.11 The 
Joint Declaration reflected the optimistic aspirations of the market socialist political economy at the 
time, even going so far as to foster hopes that a liberalizing economy within the PRC might lead to 
widespread democratization—a fantasy that was crushed by the brutal crackdown on the Beijing 
Spring in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989.12  
Following a contentious consultation process that began in the 1980s, the “one country, two systems” 
framework of the Joint Agreement became inscribed into a second document: Basic Law, Hong Kong 
SAR’s mini-constitution, which became law after July 1, 1997. Mirroring the Joint Declaration, the 
principles set out in Basic Law first acknowledge that Hong Kong is “an inalienable part of the 
People’s Republic of China” (Article 1). However, the “National People’s Congress authorizes the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy 
executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication” (Article 
2), which means that the “socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain 
unchanged for 50 years” (Article 5). 
Basic Law also sets out a vague proposal for the “gradual and orderly progress” of the development of 
“universal suffrage.” In Article 45, the mini-constitution discusses a democratic system that would 
grant Hong Kong residents the right to elect their Chief Executive (CE), the head of the Hong Kong 
government. This constitutional framework is hazy, however, because there are numerous conditions 
that can be placed on the elections. For example, Article 43 makes the CE “accountable to the Central 
People’s Government,” which means (in the language of Article 45) that he or she is ultimately 
“appointed” by Beijing and can only be a candidate “upon nomination by a broadly representative 
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” At the same time, “The ultimate 
aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage,” subject to this nominating 
committee “in accordance with democratic procedures” (Article 45). These vague democratic 
aspirations are mirrored in Basic Law’s discussion of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council: 
The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by 
election. The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in light of the actual 
situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of 
gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative 
Council by universal suffrage. (Article 68) 
For both the CE and Legislative Council, the emphasis in Basic Law is on an aspirational “gradual 
and orderly progress” toward an “ultimate aim” of universal suffrage, though the haziness of 
qualifications like “actual situation,” accountability to Beijing, and the principle of gradualism 
suggests that this mini-constitution can be interpreted to prescribe what political scientists have called 
“democracy with Chinese characteristics,” elections that are ultimately orchestrated by a central 
government.13 In this way, even the constitutional framework around democratic development in 
 5 
 
 
Hong Kong straddles the tension of the sovereignty of the “one country” over the SAR while ensuring 
the political autonomy of the “two systems.” It is the political apparatus and its discontents 
engendered by this arrangement that is the object of our theological reflection. 
 
Legislative Council and the Civil Human Rights Front: Functional Constituencies, Pan-
democratic Legislators, and the Theological Problem of Representation 
The “gradual and orderly progress” toward universal suffrage has been accomplished through the use 
of functional constituencies. Invented by the British, functional constituencies refer to seats that 
represent the political interests of trade associations in Legislative Council (Hong Kong’s lawmaking 
body) as well as in the Election Committee for the Chief Executive (see next section). Political 
scientists call this kind of system corporatism, which means that the functional constituencies are 
comprised of representative organizations for a number of economic sectors in Hong Kong’s civil 
society, such as the labor, legal, social welfare, teaching, architecture, commercial, finance, and 
medical professions. By representing cross-sections of the working public, the SAR government 
justifies the existence of functional constituencies by arguing that they supposedly give voice to the 
interest of competing social and economic sectors while serving as a stepping-stone toward full 
democracy. In 1991, functional constituencies elected 14 seats in the Legislative Council; that number 
expanded to 23 in 1995 and 28 after the 1997 handover. They are also contentious because trade 
associations that have minimal levels of popular representation gain a disproportionate amount of 
political power for their special interests, especially in the business sector, and are described as 
contributing to “small circles” elections in which only an elite few are allowed to vote. Because such 
“small circles” private gains are seen to shortchange the public interest, democratic proposals for 
universal suffrage often call for the abolition of functional constituencies as a matter of social justice. 
However, this gradual step toward democracy in an undemocratic system has not dissuaded 
democratic activists from joining the Legislative Council as pan-democratic legislators (that is, 
lawmakers that span a set of pro-democratic parties), as opposed to their pro-establishment 
counterparts (that is, lawmakers who are part of political parties loyal to Beijing). Herein lays an 
irony: The first democratic legislators, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, were elected by functional 
constituencies representing the legal and teaching trades, respectively, and others have been elected 
after the handover for the social welfare, medical, health services, and accountancy sectors as well. 
However, these democratic lawmaker-activists began their activism from outside of the government, 
for prior to the 1980s, their participation in Legislative Council would simply not have been possible 
as the British had not discussed democracy in Hong Kong for fear of triggering geopolitical conflicts 
with the PRC. Indeed, democratic movements had a long and contentious history of challenging the 
colonial government. The initial political unrest in 1960s Hong Kong revolved around discontent with 
British colonial rule. In 1966, a lone protester launched a hunger strike at the Star Ferry Pier to protest 
a hike in ferry fares, causing a riot that led to the imposition of martial law. In 1967, agitators 
attempted to draw Hong Kong into Mao Zedong’s Chinese Cultural Revolution in the PRC, resulting 
again in riots, the firing of tear gas in the streets, the assassination of a prominent radio show host, and 
a second imposition of martial law. 
Democracy movements then emerged in the 1970s as part of a wave of anti-corruption reforms 
directed at the British colonial government. Led by teacher Szeto Wah, the democratic campaigns 
began first as a teacher’s strike against a 1973 paycut with the support of the local Catholic bishop 
Francis Hsu as a mediator between the teachers and the colonial government. Szeto’s activities 
resulted in the establishment of the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union in 1974, the same year 
that the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was founded to curb police corruption. 
In 1977, Szeto’s career took off when he led a mass student movement from the Precious Blood 
Golden Jubilee Secondary School to occupy the Hong Kong Cathedral Compound, accusing the 
Roman Catholic Church under the new bishop, John-Baptist Wu, of colluding with the British 
colonial administration, as they had shut down free speech within the Catholic school. Szeto then 
established the Patriotic Chinese Democracy Movement, an organization dedicated to fostering 
democratic reforms in the PRC from Hong Kong. In turn, Protestant clergy inspired by the Golden 
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Jubilee Incident, such as Methodist pastor Rev. Lo Lung Kwong and Baptist pastor Rev. Chu 
Yiuming, ran grassroots campaigns in the 1980s to force British concessions for public policy 
favoring the working class.14 Together with Martin Lee, these early seeds of activism formed the basis 
of what became the Democratic Party. Indeed, by the 1980s, Bishop Wu—by now the face of the 
Catholic Church in dialogue with the PRC—himself became a supporter of democratic reform in 
Hong Kong. 
The introduction of functional constituencies began as a British strategy for democratic reform in 
1980s Hong Kong, enabling some of these extra-governmental democratic activists to get involved in 
the operations of the state. As the sun began to set on British colonial rule in the mid-1980s, the UK 
government introduced a model for selecting its public officials that included some elements of 
democracy in an effort toward implementing gradual progress toward universal suffrage. The Joint 
Declaration initiated new conversations between Beijing and the UK over the implementation of a 
democratic system in Hong Kong leading up to the handover. Anticipating the 1982–1984 Beijing 
talks, the UK government released a Green Paper in 1980 that proposed constitutional reforms to 
make the Hong Kong government more democratically representative. In July 1984, a second Green 
Paper introduced a system of indirect elections as the first step toward democratic development. 
After a two-month consultation period, the resulting White Paper outlined a system of electoral 
colleges (a limited set of electors comprising the District Boards representing Hong Kong’s 18 
districts, the Urban Council representing the interests of urban development, and the Regional Council 
representing the New Territories) and functional constituencies. While Legislative Council elections 
were indirect in 1985 and 1988—an unpopular move on the part of the British that caused a protest at 
Hung Hom’s Ko Sham Theatre demanding the process to be sped up—democratic reforms enacted 
after the 1989 Tiananmen incident gave the 1991 elections geographical constituencies, 
representatives elected by popular vote in geographically demarcated regions. By 1995, the last 
colonial governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, introduced a sweeping change in which the District 
Boards were themselves elected, the geographical constituencies were expanded, and the functional 
constituencies came to consist of even blue-collar trades. While these reforms did not constitute 
universal suffrage, they did give a broad base of the Hong Kong population a taste of political agency, 
an act repeatedly condemned by Beijing as turning Hong Kong into a political city that would become 
ungovernable after the handover.15  
The questions of popular representation and functional constituencies have remained contentious after 
the 1997 handover. In response to Patten’s reforms, the Preparatory Committee for the handover 
instituted a 400-member Selection Committee comprised of four broad functional sectors to elect a 
Provisional Legislative Council in 1996 that met in Shenzhen until the handover. Rolling back the late 
colonial-era attempts at democratization, the SAR government then significantly reduced the number 
of geographical-constituency seats in the 1998 legislative elections, giving more power to functional 
constituencies. 
The post-handover democracy movement can be read as a reaction to the system of functional 
constituencies, insisting through groups such as the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) that civil 
society is not constituted so much by the trade associations, but by grassroots social justice groups. In 
2003, Legislative Council attempted to pass a National Security Bill based on Basic Law’s Article 23, 
which stipulates that the SAR government “shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, 
secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets.” The 
ensuing debate pit pro-establishment government personnel, most visibly Secretary for Security 
Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, against pro-democratic legislators, the Catholic bishop Joseph Zen Ze-ken,16 
and the newly formed CHRF, which was initially convened by feminist theologian Rose Wu Lo-sai (a 
contributor to this volume) in 2002. Contrasting the tilt of functional constituencies toward the elites, 
CHRF gave voice to underrepresented civil society groups such as the tongzhi (LGBTIQ+) 
movement, women’s rights groups, grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGOs), democratic 
religious bodies, and labor unions. CHRF members have also since been elected as pan-democratic 
legislators. Objecting to the vague definitions of “sedition” in the hands of a potentially authoritarian 
government—especially the potential erosion of religious freedom by making legal room to label the 
Buddhist sect, the Falun Gong, a “proscribed society”—the CHRF organized a march on July 1, 2003, 
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that brought out a conservative estimate of 500,000 Hong Kong citizens; the July 1 Demonstration has 
reprised every year since then, demanding universal suffrage in opposition to a government that is 
seen as trying to repress the people.17 Following on the heels of criticism of government transparency 
during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak from February to May, the events of 
2003 resulted in a loss of trust in the government’s ability to work in the public interest. 
CHRF’s actions made political reform a pressing issue in Hong Kong, spurring the pan-democratic 
legislators within Legislative Council to lead demonstrations in their own right during elections and 
legislative meetings to demand universal suffrage over against “small circles” elections. On April 26, 
2004, Beijing’s National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee (the elite group of party cadres 
who speak for the PRC’s entire legislative body) indicated its preference for pushing the 
implementation universal suffrage in Hong Kong as far back as 2012, suggesting that it was starting to 
renege on its promises about democracy and SAR autonomy. At the same time, the contentious 
September 2004 legislative elections began to discredit the official Democratic Party that had been 
started by Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, as some of its candidates were dogged by the sexual and 
financial scandals. But in the wake of Article 23 and the rise of CHRF, new democratic political 
parties were also formed, relativizing the influence of the Democratic Party and introducing new post-
2003 faces into office, such as Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung (the vice-convener of the CHRF in 2002 
who ran successfully for the social welfare functional constituency in 2004), Audrey Eu Yuet-mee (a 
barrister who campaigned against Article 23 and founded the Article 45 Concern Group to advocate 
for universal suffrage), and Leung “Long Hair” Kwok Hung (a radical activist who ran as an 
independent). 
These new post-Article 23 pan-democratic politicians introduced a new dynamic of political intrigue 
around democratic reforms in Legislative Council. When Legislative Council convened in October, 
Fernando Cheung introduced a bill on behalf of the pan-democrats to stage a civil referendum gauging 
public opinion on implementing universal suffrage as early as 2007 and 2008. Cheung’s bill failed to 
pass, mostly due to political intrigue: Three democratic lawmakers elected from other functional 
constituencies had joined with the establishment in rejecting the referendum proposal. This intrigue 
extended outside the halls of Legislative Council. When CE Donald Tsang proposed in 2005 to 
expand Legislative Council to 70 seats and to increase the size of the Election Committee to elect the 
Chief Executive, pan-democratic legislators, the CHRF, and Bishop Zen protested. That grassroots 
effort turned into a 250,000-strong demonstration on December 4 and a near-unanimous vote against 
Tsang’s proposal on December 21, criticizing it for its omission of universal suffrage and its 
continuation of “small circles” elections. In other words, the politicking of the post-Article 23 pan-
democratic legislators within Legislative Council resulted in the direct mobilization of grassroots 
demonstrations—often led by the same legislators and their CHRF allies—outside of Government 
House. Put in stark terms, the pan-democratic legislators are part of the government, but they also see 
themselves as protesting the government within the government, while leading protests against the 
same government outside the government as well. 
This inside-outside government-non-government wrangling produced a division between “moderate” 
and “radical” wings within the pan-democratic legislator camp. As a moderate faction, the Civic Party 
was established in 2006 to promote a social consensus on universal suffrage through liberal civic 
education across civil society; this party included pan-democratic legislators such as Eu, Cheung, 
Ronny Tong Ka-wah, Alan Leong Kah-kit, Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee, Mandy Tam Heung-man, and 
Kuwan Hsin-chi.18 But the Civic Party’s efforts were decried as middle-class and disconnected from 
the grassroots by other pan-democratic legislators who considered themselves more “radical” in the 
sense that they would use starker tactics designed to force action on democratic issues instead of 
engaging in the slow “moderate” process of building social consensus. These “radical” lawmakers 
founded the League of Social Democrats (LSD), a political party that claimed to defend the interests 
of the grassroots poor through “radical” tactics, which often meant fulminating with no small degree 
of verbal Cantonese obscenities against the establishmentarian tendencies of both pro-Beijing and 
moderate democratic politicians associated with the Democratic and Civic parties. LSD’s core leaders 
consisted of Andrew To Kwan-hang (a longtime democratic activist and the husband of the Catholic 
Diocese’s Jackie Hung), Albert Chan Wai-yip (a longtime legislator and Christian), and Raymond 
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Wong Yuk-man (a former radio host and Christian convert). One often-cited example of LSD’s 
“radical” tactics featured Wong Yuk-man hurling bananas at then-CE Donald Tsang during his 2008 
policy address to protest the inadequacy of old-age allowances for the grassroots elderly whose 
interests he claimed to represent. The act of hurling bananas is not a respectable mode of “moderate” 
discussion; these forcible tactics are therefore considered “radical.” 
The government’s proposal to reform the 2012 Legislative Council Elections put this new 
arrangement of pan-democratic legislators, parties, and activists to the test, a process that began as 
early as 2009. On the one hand, the pan-democratic legislators of both moderate and radical ilk 
planned and participated in more politically theatrical acts together. In 2009, the government proposed 
increasing the number of legislators from 60 to 70 in a putative effort to increase representation in 
Legislative Council. This proposal followed a framework set out by the NPCSC in 2007, which now 
indicated a preference for universal suffrage to be implemented in 2017 and for 2012 to only be a year 
to advance the “gradual and orderly progress” of democratic reform. Responding to what they saw as 
a political farce of the PRC simply delaying universal suffrage indefinitely, the five pan-democratic 
legislators who had previously been elected by geographical constituency resigned in order to trigger 
a by-election in January 2010. When they were re-elected and because both the Civic and LSD parties 
gained seats, they argued that the by-election had proven that universal suffrage already works in 
Hong Kong and that delays on the part of the central government and the SAR regime in the name of 
“gradual and orderly progress” are simply disingenuous lies meant to prevent the implementation of 
democracy in Hong Kong altogether. 
However, the 2010 reforms and the ensuing 2012 legislative council elections also split the pan-
democrats along a class continuum: Those who were inclined toward the middle class have been 
accused of being themselves pro-Beijing by others who claim to represent the interests of the local 
grassroots poor. In other words, the assumption in Hong Kong politics is that the wealthy are more 
“moderate” because they associate with the central government for political favors, while the 
grassroots are suppose to be more “radical” because they are defending Hong Kong’s local identity. 
This dynamic seemed to be confirmed during the political drama around a political reform package in 
2010. The LSD and the Civic Party opposed the reforms as a reprise against which they had 
demonstrated in 2005. However, Democratic Party leaders Albert Ho Chun-yan, Emily Lau Wai-hing, 
and Cheung Man Kwong held high level talks with Beijing’s Liaison Office. To the chagrin of their 
pan-democratic colleagues, the result was that legislators in the Democratic Party voted for the 
passage of the reforms. The Democratic Party thus found itself accused of overly representing middle-
class interests, moderate enough even to be in conversation with Beijing. To be “moderate” thus 
meant to walk too closely with the pro-establishment end of this continuum, resulting in the 
moderates being accused of representing Beijing’s interests with the proof as the Democratic Party’s 
dialogue with the central government resulting in its “betrayal” vote for the reforms. 
The moderate-radical split has had direct ramifications in a new configuration of pan-democratic 
political parties. Appealing to the development of social consensus on democracy, the Civic Party 
performed well in the 2012 elections, gaining a seat in every geographical constituency and one 
functional constituency and bringing to new prominence politicians like journalist Claudia Mo Man-
ching, political scientist Kenneth Chan Ka-lok (a Roman Catholic), and medical doctor Kwok Kah-ki. 
The problem, though, is that the radicals consider the Civic Party overly “moderate,” which means 
that they accuse it of being too pro-establishment in its own right. Indeed, that the Civic Party has 
rivaled the Democratic Party in influence since 2012 makes it the main target of the grassroots 
parties’ critique of the linkage of bourgeois privilege and pro-establishment politics, especially since 
the Civic Party’s co-founder Ronny Tong Ka-wah has stated on the record that dialogue with Beijing 
could be possible on democracy. 
In turn, new radical democratic parties have also formed, divided, and been reconfigured. In 2011, 
democratic legislators led by longtime trade union leader and democracy activist Lee Cheuk-yan (also 
a Protestant Christian) formed the Labour Party in 2011, successfully placing Lee, former Civic Party 
member Fernando Cheung, gay rights advocate Cyd Ho, and Caritas social worker Cheung Kwok-che 
(that is, a Catholic working in social services) as geographical constituency representatives in 
Legislative Council in 2012. As for LSD, the aftermath of the 2010 reforms led to internal divisions 
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within the party: Wong Yuk-man and Albert Chan accused their colleague Andrew To for being too 
“moderate” because he did not join them in vehemently denouncing the Democratic Party. Wong and 
Chan then pulled together political groups disillusioned by the Democratic Party like the Frontier and 
Power Voters to found a new political party, People Power, to advance their grassroots agenda. This 
action gutted LSD, leaving Long Hair as its sole legislative member; To subsequently lost his seat. 
This radicalization also gave rise to Civic Passion in 2012, a self-proclaimed “localist” group run by 
radical activist Wong Yeung-tat, whose vehement opposition to Beijing intervention and unsuccessful 
candidacy in the 2012 elections has led to broad-brush criticisms of all the pan-democratic groups 
(including People Power) in his protest performances and through his publication, Passion Times. The 
point of “radical” democratic politics, in other words, is to escalate outrage against the establishment, 
accusing “moderates” in the pan-democratic camp of being pro-establishment in their own right while 
seeking a purer politics to challenge the government on behalf of the underrepresented grassroots. 
What needs to be remembered, of course, is that some of these “radicals” are also government 
legislators operating within Legislative Council, some are more “radical” than others, and some are 
activists outside of the government. 
These divisions over functional constituencies suggest that the theological issue that arises from 
reflection on the CHRF and the pan-democratic legislators is representation. While the issue on the 
table has been universal suffrage since the British reforms of the 1980s, the “gradual and orderly 
progress” wrought by functional constituencies has engendered a social polity in which even the 
democratic activists and legislators claim to represent and are accused of representing specific 
segments of civil society. Reflecting on the theological significance of partisan divisions, theologians 
might ask why this inversion of the establishment’s undemocratic strategy has been so successfully 
grounded in strife among the pan-democratic legislators, especially because so many of them are 
Catholic and Protestant—and have been influenced by Joseph Cardinal Zen, to boot. Indeed, this 
infighting is significant because frustration with political parties can be traced as one of the causes of 
the student frustrations that led to the Umbrella Movement, a protest occupation in which all of these 
pan-democratic legislators and activists (including those in the vilified Democratic Party), as well as 
(moderate) CHRF members, actively participated. 
Indeed, these divisions do not mean that there is no coalition building among the pan-democrats; in 
fact, the pan in pan-democratic simultaneously indicates that there is both serious infighting on the 
one hand, but also general agreement that democratic reform is their common cause. In a remarkable 
show of unity, the (somewhat radical) LSD’s Long Hair joined with (the quite radical) People 
Power’s Albert Chan and Wong Yuk-man to stage a filibuster in 2012 in an attempt to stop the 
government from passing a bill to prevent lawmakers who resigned in the future from participating in 
by-elections and trigger the political crisis of 2010 all over again. While pro-establishment forces in 
Legislative Council succeeded in passing the bill when its pro-Beijing president Jasper Tsang Yok-
Tsing invoked a procedural rule to end the filibuster, the effort suggested that pan-democratic 
cooperation could still be possible despite the infighting over representational politics. 
But building pan-democratic coalitions and fighting over functional constituencies is but a third of the 
story of how the apparatus plays out. If reforming the Legislative Council raises theological questions 
about representation, then we must now move to the Executive Branch to examine how the Chief 
Executive elections elicit problems over Christian groups actively participating in the “small circles” 
elections. 
The Chief Executive Elections: Functional Constituencies, Private Property, and the Theological 
Question of Participation 
While the participation of individual Catholics and Protestants may have only occurred at the personal 
(as opposed to institutional) level in the fractious coalitional pan-democratic partisan politics of 
Legislative Council, religion plays an even more controversial role in the CE elections because the 
functional constituencies that compose the Election Committee include religious sectors and 
institutions. 
With elections occurring every five years, the centrality of functional constituencies in this committee 
raises an even stronger charge of “small circles” elections and amplifies the urgency of universal 
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suffrage. When a preparatory Selection Committee selected the first CE in 1996, democratic activists 
denounced its composition as primarily of professional elites whose business and political interests 
inclined them to watch for Beijing to signal their preference for a candidate. In the lead-up to the 2002 
Second CE Elections, a controversial news clip in 2000 featured the Beijing leader Jiang Zemin 
fuming at the press for asking him to indicate whether he supported the re-election of the (unpopular) 
first CE, businessman Tung Chee-hwa: “Too simple, sometimes naïve,” he called the young 
journalists, indicating that he knew that there would be political turmoil if Beijing openly supported a 
candidate for Hong Kong.19 If the discussion of the pan-democratic legislators demonstrated that 
Christians have had a strong record playing the pan-democratic opposition to the undemocratic SAR 
and Beijing governments, the drama around the CE elections suggest that there is an equal record of 
both Catholics and Protestants who seek to reinforce the power of the establishment to further their 
political interests, which are often linked to private property. Symptomatic of the “small circles” 
elections, these collusions with private interests raise the stakes for debating the appropriateness of 
Christians, both Catholics and Protestants, participating in the SAR political apparatus. 
Fraught with controversy, participation in the Election Committee has become a theological question 
for both Catholics and Protestants. Mirroring the trade associations, just fewer than 10 % of the 
Election Committee seats are given to representative organizations for the six major religions in Hong 
Kong: the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, the Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Association, 
the Hong Kong Christian Council (HKCC), the Hong Kong Taoist Association, the Confucian 
Academy, and the Hong Kong Buddhist Association. While each religious association determines 
their own method for selecting electors, such participation has proven controversial because it 
involves religious associations in the reinforcement of the “small circles” elections. Understanding 
this dynamic, the Catholic Diocese practices an informal policy of “passive collaboration,” allowing 
individual Roman Catholics to apply directly to the Election Committee and only being willing to 
confirm their baptismal records; in this way, the Catholic Church cannot be accused of either actively 
endorsing or withdrawing from the elections.20 Indeed, the distance that such passive collaboration 
has afforded Catholics from the government has enabled Joseph Cardinal Zen and the Catholic 
Diocese’s Justice and Peace Commission to be champions for universal suffrage and human rights in 
the SAR. 
By contrast, Protestants found themselves embroiled in controversy by attempting to actively 
participate in these religious functional constituencies. The 1996 Selection Committee was itself a 
lightning rod. When the Preparatory Committee invited the ecumenical HKCC, the Anglican Church, 
the Christ Church in China, and the Federation of Christian Churches to participate, the HKCC’s lack 
of coordination with the Anglican Church led to contradictory voting on whether Protestants should 
participate in only the CE elections, the selection of the Provisional Legislative Council, or both—
indicating that the ecumenical unity in the ecumenical Protestant body was not as ecumenically united 
as they made it out to be.21 Made a laughing stock, the HKCC compounded its problems when it 
responded positively to Xinhua New China News Agency’s call for the six major religious 
associations to participate in the patriotic celebration of National Day, suggesting that if the 
denominations in the entire ecumenical organization could agree on anything, it was that it was pro-
establishment.22 Developing mistrust with the public, the HKCC’s subsequent attempt to institute free 
Protestant elections for their functional constitutency seats in the Election Committee brought even 
more criticism that the HKCC was a pro-establishment front attempting to reinforce the “small 
circles” election and thus the power of Beijing over Hong Kong.23 Until the mid-2000s, such 
ecumenical Protestant participation in the CE elections themselves was thus widely panned: The 1996 
free elections was a logistical nightmare, only to be topped by the utter disaster of the 2002 election 
when the HKCC experimented with a lottery system. In this second election, fewer than seven 
candidates initially put themselves forward for lottery and then thirty more handed in their names at 
the very last minute, resulting in a last-minute organizational scramble. Predictably, the incumbent CE 
Tung Chee Hwa—by then already rather unpopular with the Hong Kong populace—was re-elected by 
an Election Committee that cared less about Tung’s popularity and more about the fact that he was 
pro-business and generally liked by Beijing, a point underscored by the fact that after Tung later 
stepped down as CE in 2005, Beijing appointed him as one of the vice-chairmen of the Chinese 
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People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the large political advisory body in the PRC 
that has no small influence over the country’s legislative direction. 
While the HKCC represented more “ecumenical” Protestants, their evangelical and Pentecostal 
counterparts faced increasing scrutiny in the mid-2000s, for their large congregations and sizable 
economic capital—which had previously existed solely within the ambit of the private sector—also 
became politicized. Prior to the mid-2000s, evangelical involvement with the government tended to 
take place on an individual basis, albeit usually with a pro-establishment bent. For example, 
Breakthrough Movement’s Philemon Choi Yuen-wan was Commissioner of Youth in the Tung 
Administration in 1998, a dubious honor that earned Choi criticism for participating in the workings 
of an undemocratic government. So too, the charismatic renewal group Jireh Fund was founded in 
1999 after the 1997 Asian financial crisis to call evangelicals to pray for economic and political 
stability in Hong Kong. However, this appeal to spirituality actually thinly veiled the Jireh Fund’s 
support for the pro-Beijing establishment, for they also invited CEs Tung Chee Hwa and Donald 
Tsang to their events as guests of honor in the 2000s and openly supported the pro-Beijing 
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) candidates in 2012.24 The 
point, though, is that prior to the mid-2000s, these groups were not part of the electoral process 
because they were not part of the ecumenical mainline HKCC, even though they were already pro-
establishment and had already established links with the CE’s administration. 
The events of 2003 resulted in evangelical megachurches and Pentecostals joining the electoral 
process. During the SARS crisis, Pentecostals received a boost in popularity because one of the 
prominent doctors who had succumbed to the disease while helping patients, Dr. Joanna Tse Yuen-
man, was Pentecostal; her funeral was widely broadcast on television. Simultaneously, the disaster of 
Article 23 resulted in Tung’s health-related resignation in 2005, although he was somehow healthy 
enough to immediately become a new vice-chairman of the CPPCC. A hastily concocted Election 
Committee then put a second CE, then-Chief Secretary Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, into power.25 Tsang 
was widely known as a devout Roman Catholic, as was rising star political administrator Carrie Lam 
Cheng Yuet-ngor. Through the Tsang Administration’s Chief Secretary, Rafael Hui Si-yan, the CE 
office was also friendly with a property tycoon who was openly evangelical, Thomas Kwok, the chair 
of the third-largest property company in Hong Kong, Sun Hung Kei Properties. The raised public 
profile of evangelical Protestantism led to the growth of several megachurch congregations that were 
also attended by media celebrities and government officials. Indeed, several Canto-pop actors and 
Hong Kong actors underwent rather public evangelical conversions during this time, including the 
highest-paid Canto-pop singer in Hong Kong, Sammi Cheng Sau-man. As evangelicals and 
Pentecostals accumulated social, political, and economic capital, they channeled their newfound civic 
enthusiasm and connections with the Tsang Administration into the erection of large-scale spectacles 
designed to impact the political culture of the city. One effort was a concerted celebrity-led initiative 
to find Noah’s Ark on Mount Ararat in Turkey, which culminated in the building of a life-size Ark 
replica on Ma Wan Island. Another was a star-powered Global Day of Prayer that brought together 
establishment politicians, revivalists, and thousands of evangelicals for an annual prayer gathering at 
sports stadiums.26  
Using their political capital, these new Pentecostal and evangelical megachurch players began to 
impact the political culture of the city. As the 2007 Third CE Elections drew near, the HKCC 
announced that it would once again hold free elections, but in this election, any Protestant Christian 
could run, even if they were not from the mainline denominations conventionally represented by the 
ecumenical body.27 The Pentecostals and evangelical megachurches were ready. Encouraging 
megachurch congregation members to vote at ballot boxes strategically placed near their churches, 
these new participants in the CE elections advanced a privatized view of civic participation, leading to 
heated debate in the pages of the Hong Kong newspaper, the Christian Times, as their more 
progressive counterparts argued that the megachurches and Pentecostal movements had hijacked the 
democratic process. The elections themselves were contentious: While the incumbent Donald Tsang 
seemed favored by Beijing, the formation of the Civic Party and its (incidentally Roman Catholic) 
candidate Alan Leong’s campaign brought such a serious challenge that televised debates and pan-
democratic political stunts ruled the airwaves. Unsurprisingly, as campaigns for the popular vote 
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mean relatively little in a place without universal suffrage, the Election Committee once again chose 
Tsang. 
However, the lack of political agency did not mean an absence of political identity. By the mid- to 
late-2000s, a generation of young activists, including Christian ones, enacted a politics of local Hong 
Kong identity and began using tactics of occupying heritage sites to build a vision of Hong Kong 
culture mostly directed against the Tsang administration’s agenda for making Hong Kong an 
international financial center. In 2006, the Tsang administration’s announcement that it would 
demolish the historic Star Ferry Pier radicalized activists who called themselves part of a “post-1980s 
generation,” forming a group called Local Action that argued that Hong Kong identity was tied to 
historic places. It is here that the occupation movements actually begin: Local Action physically 
occupied the Star Ferry site until its demolition. In 2007, the Tsang administration’s relocation of 
another port, Queen’s Pier, to build a road between Sheung Wan and Wan Chai met with opposition 
from Local Action, whose occupation of the site drove then-Secretary of Development Carrie Lam to 
negotiate with them and made her the unofficial apologist for the government, a role that she reprised 
in 2014 during the Umbrella Movement.28  
These redevelopment projects, as well as struggles to preserve historic roads like King Yin Lei and 
Wing Lee Street in 2009 and 2010, contributed to insinuations that the Tsang administration was in 
cahoots with private interests over against public opinion. The 2010 Chinese translation of tycoon-
secretary-turned-columnist Alice Poon’s English-language Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong 
offered a protest slogan for the times: “地產霸權” [“Property hegemony,” or in Cantonese, deichan 
bahkuen].29 Though Poon’s text offered a century-long historical reading of property speculation 
manipulating government policy, the moniker of “property hegemony” initiated even more post-1980s 
outrage over housing unaffordability, gentrification, and the conditions of those living in “cage 
houses” (small units subdivided only by iron bars) and “subdivided rooms” (rental units in which 
bedrooms were divided further). 
In turn, the slogan of “property hegemony” created the link in the popular imagination that the pro-
establishment Christians’ support for the established regime was in fact them acting in cahoots with 
the Tsang administration’s redevelopment policies. Indeed, the author of Land and the Ruling Class in 
Hong Kong was actually a secretary at Sun Hung Kei Properties who had quit her job, moved to 
Vancouver, and gone rogue; the owner of Sun Hung Kei Properties, it should be remembered, was the 
evangelical tycoon Thomas Kwok, who also put up money for the Noah’s Ark project. In addition, 
Chinese American rapper MC Jin had been baptized in a Hong Kong megachurch shortly after his 
arrival in Hong Kong in 2008; in 2010, he became the official spokesperson for Tsang’s 
developmentalist program in a Christmas video rap with the CE called “Act Now.”30  
With these allegations of hegemonic property collusions between megachurch celebrity evangelicals 
and the Tsang administration in the air, the politics of the post-1980s generation took a theological 
turn. Divinity students and activists, mostly with educational roots from the Chung Chi Divinity 
School at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, formed the Alliance for the Return to the Christian 
Spirit. Their initial activities revolved around the star-studded Global Day of Prayer in 2009 and 2010, 
where they showed up to protest that the collusion between Christians and the propertied 
establishment had sullied the “Christian spirit” of walking the narrow way of the poor and the 
marginalized; each time, they were escorted out of the premises.31 They also protested the Tsang 
administration’s plan for greater regional economic integration through a Hong Kong Express Rail 
Link to Guangzhou in 2010. This plan was especially controversial because it involved demolishing a 
New Territories village, Choi Yuen Tsuen. The Alliance for the Return to the Christian Spirit also 
held prayer meetings at Choi Yuen Tsuen, joining in solidarity with protesters who were using 
Buddhist rituals for protest.32 So too, a theological campaign in 2011 spearheaded by New Testament 
exegete Sam Tsang (a contributor to this volume, with no relation to the second CE) exposed the 
financial improprieties and scholarly inadequacies of Noah’s Ark Ministries, tarnishing the 
reputations of the evangelical megachurches that had built their political capital on links with property 
tycoons and the state establishment.33 The emergence of these democratic identity politics in turn 
drew the wrath of evangelical megachurches: Kong Fok Evangelical Free Church’s Rev. Daniel Ng 
Chung-man denounced them as a form of “mob politics.”34  
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As Donald Tsang’s second CE term drew to a close, the CE property scandals that began to unravel 
during the 2012 Fourth CE Elections demonstrated that there was active collusion between the CEs, 
the private sectors of property acquisition and corporate business, and the Catholic and Protestant 
religious establishments. Toward the end of Tsang’s term, investigative journalists discovered that 
Tsang had been afforded certain luxury privileges by wealthy magnates and even the Triad criminal 
underworld: a junket and private plane, an apartment in Shenzhen for a very discounted price from a 
developer friend, dinner in a Macau casino with tycoons and suspected members of the Triad societies 
in the criminal underworld. When Cardinal Zen’s successor, John Hon Cardinal Tong, defended 
Tsang as a devout daily mass attendee, his comments that “he who is without sin should cast the first 
stone” sparked public outrage. 
But the new CE candidates in 2012 were no better. The initially favored candidate, Henry Tang Ying-
yen, fell prey to the tabloids when they discovered that he had erected an “illegal structure”—a 
basement and swimming pool—at his house. When Tang subsequently blamed it on his wife, the 
news then broke that he had had an affair with his former assistant, Shirley Yuen. Tang’s political 
fortunes in Beijing—and thus also in Hong Kong—then began to reverse. The final nail in the Tang 
campaign’s coffin was when he revealed at the all-candidates’ debate that his opponent, Leung Chun-
ying (popularly known as CY Leung), had proposed as Executive Council convener to use violent 
police methods to disperse the July 1 Demonstration over Article 23 in 2003. The allegations were 
meant to spark outrage at Leung’s authoritarian streak, and it most certainly did, as demonstrators hit 
the streets wearing cardboard tanks to link Leung’s attitude with the PRC’s military crackdown during 
Tiananmen Square’s Beijing Spring in 1989. However, Tang had also violated the confidentiality of 
Executive Council discussions where Leung had supposedly made these comments, which meant that 
Tang had politically disqualified himself. In the ensuing political circus, Protestant pastors and 
theologians of both ecumenical and evangelical ilk attempted to intervene by calling for a more 
rational atmosphere for civic participation. However, their newspaper statements also elicited 
controversy for their allegedly vague support for the establishment, which discredited these 
Protestants in the eyes of the democracy movement. 
With Tang’s reputation in tatters, the Election Committee elected his opponent, CY Leung, in the 
2012 election, only to have the newspapers discover after his victory that he too had erected an illegal 
structure at his home. Indeed, for all of the indiscretions that had cost Tang the top job in Hong Kong, 
the Leung administration itself has been dogged by property scandals. At the height of the 2014 
Umbrella Movement, the Sydney Morning Herald revealed that Leung had not disclosed when he 
became CE that he had significant holdings in the private corporation UGL, an Australian company 
that has some interests in Hong Kong’s property market. So too, Leung’s Secretary for Development 
Paul Chan Mo-po—himself openly evangelical—came under fire in 2013 for having a conflict of 
interest because he owned a plot of New Territories land that the government intended to develop. 
Finally, in late 2014, a crackdown by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) sent 
to prison both the previous Tsang administration’s former Chief Secretary, Rafael Hui Si-yan, and 
Sun Hung Kei Properties’ Thomas Kwok (the evangelical who had put up the money for Noah’s Ark) 
for participating in a bribery scheme, confirming the rumors that pro-establishment evangelicals were 
key to the corrupt link between the CE administrations and the property tycoons. 
The publicization of these scandals tying conservative Christians of both Protestant and Catholic ilk, 
the CE administrations, and private property interests together reveals one of the key stakes in the 
demand for genuine universal suffrage: Hong Kong people’s rights to probe government corruption, 
develop affordable housing, and preserve local urban culture in the built environment. These demands 
are theological because the Christian role in functional constituencies coincided with the realignment 
of evangelical interests around private property and the established economic security of Hong 
Kong.35 The question of public participation is not simple, then, for Protestant and Catholic 
participation in the SAR apparatus has ironically led to the privatization of politics, revealed most 
clearly in the corruption scandals that have dogged the government since 2012. In turn, the politics of 
property has further radicalized a post-1980s generation of activists, some of whom have rearticulated 
theology for their protest movements. As we shall finally see in an examination of Hong Kong’s 
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judiciary, these theological articulations are ultimately about the materiality of human rights in Hong 
Kong. 
Is the Court of Final Appeal Final? Judicial Autonomy and Theological Reflections on Minority 
Rights 
The questions of Hong Kong’s political autonomy and democratic development might seem unrelated 
from the question of minority rights, but as I shall show, there is a deep correlation between the two. 
While the 2011 census found that 93.6 % of Hong Kong’s seven million people remain Chinese and 
89.5 % of the population use Cantonese as their usual language, the second and third highest ethnic 
groups in the SAR are Indonesian (0.8 % in 2001, 1.3 % in 2006, and 1.9 % in 2011) and Filipino (2.1 
% in 2001, 1.6 % in 2006, and 1.9 % in 2011). Of the total population, 60.5 % were born in Hong 
Kong, 32.1 % in the PRC, Macao, and Taiwan, and 7.4 % elsewhere.36 The story that these numbers 
tell is that of a society dominated by Cantonese-speaking Chinese residents, but is also populated by 
some racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities from both Filipino and Indonesian migrant workers as 
well as regular migration from the PRC. While the SAR legislative and executive branches have 
passed policies to deal with minority rights, much of the drama around migration and minorities has 
taken place in the judiciary. The Sino-British Joint Declaration vests the SAR government with 
“independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication” (3.3), which is apportioned by Basic 
Law in the Court of Final Appeal (Article 82). However, as we shall see, the courts have also been a 
site where the “one country, two systems” framework has also been eroded and the independence of 
the judiciary questioned by democratic activists in the name of human rights for Hong Kong’s 
minority populations. These questions lead to theological reflection on the place of minorities in Hong 
Kong’s polity. 
The question of immigration in Hong Kong is ultimately about the judicial autonomy of the SAR. The 
key term in these debates is “the right of abode,” a residency right promised in Basic Law’s Article 24 
to anyone who has lived in Hong Kong for “not less than seven years.” The political drama around the 
right of abode can be traced to the 1999 Court of Final Appeal case, Ng Ka Ling v. Director of 
Immigration. Amalgamating four test cases of persons born in the PRC whose parents had lived in 
Hong Kong “not less than seven years,” the legal question was whether these persons had the right of 
abode in Hong Kong. Appealing to the legal autonomy of Hong Kong SAR as well as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the court ruled that the right of abode was a 
human right that was guaranteed by both Basic Law and international standards. This ruling so 
troubled the SAR government that it then released a report alleging that an estimated 1.67 million 
people could be eligible for the right of abode under the Ng Ka Ling decision, which they argued 
would incur an additional HKD$33 billion and require 60 hectares of land (“almost five times the size 
of Chek Lap Kok airport”) to accommodate PRC migrants who would move to Hong Kong.37 In this 
way, the SAR government molded public discourse along the lines of a local Hong Kong identity 
politics with its requisite anti-mainland inflections with an economic argument. Upon a 
recommendation from Regina Ip—the same Security for Security who later oversaw the Article 23 
debacle in 2003—CE Tung Chee Hwa forwarded the case to Beijing’s NPCSC, which promptly 
reinterpreted Basic Law to deny the test cases the right of abode and effectively vacated the court’s 
decision. In other words, the highest Hong Kong court had decided in favor of the migrants, but 
because the SAR government did not like the decision, it asked the Beijing central government to 
vacate the decision—and it did. So much for judicial autonomy! 
The PRC central government’s reinterpretation brought liberation theology in line with the politics of 
Hong Kong’s judicial autonomy. The Catholic Diocese’s Bishop Zen, the Justice and Peace 
Commission, and Italian Catholic liberation theology practitioner Fr. Franco Mella issued statements 
condemning the move as violating the human rights of migrants attempting to enter Hong Kong. At 
the same time, the appeal to the NPCSC sparked demonstrations against the violation of the “final 
adjudication” clause of both the Joint Declaration and Basic Law. In this way, the political agency of 
migrants—a cipher for universal suffrage—and the local autonomy of Hong Kong have been 
ironically fused, although popular opinion also maintains that the SAR government has an economic 
responsibility to care for Hong Kong residents before migrants. Since Ng Ka Ling, two additional 
issues on the right of abode have surfaced. In 2011, controversy erupted when expectant mothers from 
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the PRC came to Hong Kong to give birth, allegedly overcrowding public hospitals so that reports 
were published suggesting that Hong Kong women could not get beds while the PRC migrants 
acquired for their born-in-Hong-Kong children the right of abode. At the same time, migrant workers, 
mostly domestic helpers from the Philippines and Indonesia, fought for the right of abode because the 
SAR government had passed laws denying imported workers and domestic helpers the category of 
“ordinarily resident” that was required to obtain right of abode. Again, Fr. Mella and the Catholic 
Diocese’s Justice and Peace Commission were the most visible in their fight on behalf of the migrant 
workers, with Mella even founding a Right of Abode University to educate migrant workers on basic 
language and social science skills in order to equip them with tools for political agency. However, the 
Court of Final Appeal denied their 2012 appeal case Vallejos and Domingo v. Commissioner of 
Registration, arguing that domestic helpers were part of a temporary population and that the 
Legislative Council had the right to define its own terms in immigration law. In turn, the centrality of 
the PRC mothers during the 2012 CE elections elicited promises from the candidates to ban them all 
from public hospitals; when CY Leung was elected, he did just that. Just as Ng Ka Ling showed that 
the Hong Kong judiciary is not independent from political machinations in Beijing, Vallejos raised the 
question of the judiciary’s independence from the other branches of government, entangling the courts 
in the private property and representational disputes plaguing the Legislative Council and the CE. 
Migrants are not the only minorities that concern Hong Kong’s judiciary; the courts have also 
adjudicated on sexual minorities. The Court of First Instance case, Cho Man Kit v. Broadcasting 
Authority, raises a number of issues related to public opinion on sexual orientation. Filed in 2007, the 
case revolved around the Hong Kong Broadcasting Authority’s formal admonition against Radio and 
Television Hong Kong (RTHK) when it aired the documentary Gay Lovers, a film depicting gay and 
lesbian aspirations for a future of inclusion in Hong Kong, including with same-sex marriage. In the 
wake of Article 23, conservative evangelicals associated with organizations like the Society of Truth 
and Light, Hong Kong Sex-Culture Society, and the Alliance for Family Values had successfully 
lobbied against the Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ordinance (SODO) in 2005, alleging that 
giving employment and residency rights to sexual minorities would lead to reverse discrimination 
toward traditional families and the silencing of their rights to free speech in reinforcing their 
heteronormativity. Evangelicals associated with these groups also filed complaints against Gay 
Lovers, alleging that RTHK had failed to air an objective documentary that presented both sides of the 
issues for sexual minorities. Gay activist Joseph Cho Man-kit then sued the Broadcasting Authority, 
forwarding its admonition to the high court. The court ruled that the Broadcasting Authority had 
indeed overstepped its bounds in proscribing freedom of speech. Like the Ng Ka Ling and Vallejos 
cases, Cho Man Kit also highlights that there exists two understandings of freedom of speech and 
democratic rights in Hong Kong, one that advocates for minority voices and the other that mobilizes 
free speech to reinforce the majority status quo. 
Because these court decisions are inseparable from the other parts of the SAR government, they 
reveal another dimension of the call for universal suffrage: because racialized, gendered, and 
sexualized minorities in Hong Kong do not have anyone to speak for them in the apparatus, they need 
to be given the power to vote in order to express their political agency and shape a city of inclusion. 
While the majority of Hongkongers are Cantonese Chinese, these cases raise the question of whether 
racial and sexual minorities are included within its polity. Moreover, the involvement of Catholics and 
Protestants on both the establishment and democratic sides of these minority rights debates suggest 
that the question of majority rule versus minority voice is theological at heart. 
The SAR Apparatus and Theologies of Protest: Toward the Umbrella Movement 
This survey of the Hong Kong SAR political and legal apparatus has been necessary because it brings 
us finally to the Umbrella Movement’s demands for universal suffrage. As we have seen, this demand 
is not new. With democratic aspirations coming from the late colonial British era in the 1980s and 
1990s, the promise of universal suffrage is inscribed both in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the 
SAR’s Basic Law. While the issues on paper appear to be strictly secular, putting the apparatus to 
work in the actual events following 1997 have raised the question of whether the “gradual and orderly 
progress” toward universal suffrage is in fact causing more division and social injustice in the realms 
of political representation, government participation, and minority rights. With Catholics and 
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Protestants at the forefront of both democratic activism and pro-establishment legitimation, these 
issues are theological questions with a range of possible opinions and justifications. 
Focusing on the actual practice of the SAR’s political apparatus in this “one country, two systems” 
arrangement brings a sense of materiality into what might seem to be a hazy ideology of democracy 
and universal suffrage. While the operations of the Legislative Council, the CE, and the judiciary may 
seem standard on paper and despite the pretensions of functional constituencies to be a stepping stone 
toward full democracy, the way that the apparatus has actually been put to work has skewed Hong 
Kong toward an elite government in economic collusion with corporate business and property 
tycoons. To wax theoretical, the call for democracy is akin to geographer David Harvey’s argument 
that the capital of such a society must be returned from its extra-legal proprietors to the commons.38 
Because of such an emphasis on the common good, the pan-democratic legislators, post-1980s local 
heritage activists, radical democrats, human rights workers, and even religious leaders have formed 
uneasy and often contentious alliances to restore political agency to Hong Kong people. It is with this 
understanding of all that democracy means—and does not mean—in specific relation to Hong Kong’s 
political apparatus that we can finally turn to the Umbrella Movement, its demand for universal 
suffrage, and its theological implications. 
 
The Umbrella Movement and Occupy Central: An Orientation 
We move now to consider how the dissatisfaction with the political and legal apparatus of Hong Kong 
SAR since 1997 led to the mass act of civil disobedience of the Umbrella Movement in 2014. To 
understand this transition, we will first need an even closer look at the events of 2013–2014, 
especially the emergence of a pro-democracy civil society movement, Occupy Central with Love and 
Peace (OCLP), and the concurrent erosions of free speech in Hong Kong during the same two years. 
As we shall see, these events led directly into the theological moment of the Umbrella Movement, a 
leaderless movement that unexpectedly followed OCLP that is the main point of reflection in this 
volume. 
Occupy Central with Love and Peace: Democratic Deliberation and the Idea of Civil 
Disobedience in 2013–2014 
While OCLP is not certainly not equivalent to the Umbrella Movement, the key ideas about 
democracy in the Umbrella Movement can be traced back to OCLP’s slow deliberative process. 
Indeed, the notion of civil disobedience originated at the beginning of the OCLP movement in a 2013 
opinion-editorial penned by constitutional lawyer Benny Tai Yiu-ting for the Hong Kong Economic 
Journal. Intending to be provocative, he argued that non-violent civil disobedience was a “weapon of 
mass destruction” deployed by decolonizing activists like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King 
Jr. to force governments toward concessions—in this case, to grant Hong Kong people universal 
suffrage first through legal means of civil deliberation, and then through illegal means of shutting 
down the financial core of Hong Kong Central, through a nonviolent sit-in occupation.39 Hearkening 
back to the origins of the democracy movement, Tai joined with the Rev. Chu Yiuming (the Baptist 
pastor who had organized grassroots democracy movements in the 1980s and was a friend of the late 
Szeto Wah) and Chan Kin-man (a sociologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong specializing in 
civil society) to found OCLP, an organization that sought to educate the Hong Kong public about 
democracy and civil disobedience by organizing Deliberation Days, meetings of citizens at schools 
and churches to discuss proposals for electoral reform.40  
These colloquially named “D-Days” gave rise to three proposals from three groups that emerged as 
consolidated voices in the democracy movement. One was the Alliance for True Democracy, a 
coalition of pan-democratic legislators and their political parties. A second was People Power, the 
radical democratic political party that had gutted LSD over the 2010 political reform package. The 
third was Scholarism, an organization of secondary-school students led by Joshua Wong. Scholarism 
was a particularly important player because it consisted of secondary school students who had been 
politicized in 2011 due to the government’s attempt to implement a National and Moral Education 
Curriculum in elementary and secondary schools. Alleging that the new curriculum would 
 17 
 
 
"brainwash" Hong Kong students to uncritically devote themselves to the mainland, Scholarism had 
spearheaded a movement to call critical attention to schools in Hong Kong, putting the students at the 
forefront of the democracy movement as they demanded to have their voices taken seriously in the 
political system. Scholarism’s actions boiled over into a social and political crisis in 2012, when 
120,000 Hongkongers hit the streets to denounce the introduction of the pro-PRC patriotic 
“brainwashing” curriculum, successfully resulting in having the materials shelved and underscoring 
the need for universal suffrage in a system not controlled by the mainland. OCLP’s inclusion of these 
secondary students demonstrated that while they had not reached the age of majority to vote in any 
future hypothetical election, they were still a key part of Hong Kong’s civic conversation. 
OCLP gave rise to over a year of social conversation about civil disobedience, coinciding with a 
series of incidents that threatened to undermine free speech in Hong Kong. On the one hand, OCLP 
generated its share of criticism for proposing that citizens should perform “illegal” actions of civil 
disobedience; denounced by pro-establishment legislators, OCLP received its other major source of 
criticism from evangelical megachurch pastor Rev. Daniel Ng, the Anglican Archbishop Paul Kwong, 
and the Anglican Provincial Secretary Rev. Peter Koon, all of whom decried the movement for 
attempting to undermine the city’s economic security. However, OCLP also coincided with a series of 
events from 2013 to 2014 that demonstrated in popular opinion that the freedoms of speech and the 
press were being eroded. On July 14, 2013, a frustrated Catholic elementary school teacher, Alpais 
Lam Wai-sze, shouted, “What the f—-” at police who had surrounded a Falun Gong booth; the 
ensuing social discussion about whether she should have used profanity highlighted the 
establishment’s rollbacks of freedom of speech, both for democratic protesters like Lam and for the 
Falun Gong. On October 20, 2013, 120,000 Hongkongers again took to the streets to protest the 
government refusing the relicense of the Hong Kong Television Network Ltd (HKTV), effectively 
closing off streams of the media that were deemed to conflict too much with the government’s 
agenda. On February 26, 2014, suspected Triad members knifed the former editor of the newspaper 
Ming Pao, Kevin Lau Chun-to, who was known for his democratic views (and who is, incidentally, a 
Protestant Christian), sparking protests alleging that the government had resorted to the use of thugs 
to silence dissent and giving rise to the slogan, “They can’t kill us all!” In short, the events of OCLP 
coincided with no fewer than three major protests from 2012 to 2014: the National and Moral 
Curriculum crisis in 2012, the HKTV protest in 2013, and the demonstrations for a free press system 
in 2014. 
By the spring of 2014, the D-Days had generated three proposals for electoral reform, all of which 
introduced the controversial new concept that came to define not only OCLP, but the later Umbrella 
Movement: civil nomination, that is, the right for Hong Kong residents to directly nominate their own 
candidates without them being vetted by Beijing. While the terms of Basic Law’s Article 45 were 
hazily democratic and provided for a “broadly representative nominating committee” to vet 
candidates, the Alliance for True Democracy, Scholarism, and People Power all proposed scrapping 
the nomination committee for an electoral system featuring the direct nomination of candidates by 
citizens. As OCLP prepared these proposals for an informal, non-binding civil referendum vote 
among the Hong Kong citizenry, the NPCSC fired a warning shot in a White Paper on “The Practice 
of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’” on June 10, 2014, arguing that while Hong Kong might have 
some semblance of local governing autonomy, its political apparatus was ultimately under the 
sovereignty of the PRC.41 In short, this White Paper insinuated that the referendum that OCLP was 
preparing to undertake was technically “illegal,” a point that Tai challenged as there was nothing in 
the Basic Law that said that one could not take a civil referendum. From June 22–29, 792,808 valid 
votes were cast; while the winning proposal was from the Alliance for True Democracy, consensus 
had already developed around civil nomination, and a sense of the necessity of civil disobedience was 
growing because of the White Paper. 
The only trouble was that, by this point, OCLP’s potential for actually committing acts of civil 
disobedience began to be called into question. Young people who had committed to OCLP were 
determined to have some radical activity to place: for example, Scholarism staged a practice round of 
Occupy Central at Chater Road after the annual July 1 Demonstration in 2014, resulting in the arrests 
of 511 students and their supporters. These actions met with an unusual response, as pro-
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establishment forces began holding their own agitated protests against the democratic protesters. From 
July 19 to August 17, 2014, the main anti-Occupy organization, named the Alliance for Peace and 
Democracy as a parody of the pan-democratic Alliance for True Democracy in OCLP, organized a 
signature campaign that collected one million signatures of citizens who said that they opposed 
OCLP’s proposal to commit civil disobedience, though some questioned the validity of the autographs 
because video evidence suggested that the anti-Occupy group had actually paid its protesters to sign 
its forms and to participate in their August 17 Anti-Occupy parade. 
OCLP’s response to this increasing polarization was tepid at best. On August 31, OCLP received its 
final answer from the NPCSC by deciding that civil nomination was out of the question.42 At this 
point, however, OCLP admitted that it did not have the support it thought it would have to carry out a 
massive shut-down of the Central district and would instead stage a symbolic “banquet” on October 1 
during the National Day ceremonies.43 Stoking frustration among young people wanting to 
accomplish real civil disobedience, OCLP’s moderation in turn triggered a series of student strikes on 
September 22. These strikes, as we shall now see, turned into a series of protests that spiraled out of 
OCLP’s wildest imagination and ability to control. 
The Umbrella Movement: Practicing Civil Disobedience in a Leaderless Movement 
September 28, 2014, is usually designated as the starting point of the Umbrella Movement because it 
is the day that the street occupations began in order to protect secondary school and university 
students who had launched class boycotts for “genuine universal suffrage.” However, the real start 
date of the movement can be put back one week before September 28. Frustrated by OCLP, the Hong 
Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and secondary school protest organization Scholarism launched 
a series of student strikes on September 22, 2014, citing the need for Hong Kong youth to exert their 
political agency over a city that they deemed increasingly governed by a political and economic 
oligarchy. Beginning with faculty teach-ins and on-campus demonstrations for democracy, the 
students moved toward urban demonstrations as the week moved on. 
By September 26, the students had agreed to occupy one symbolic target, Civic Square in Admiralty. 
Located near government buildings, Civic Square had been securitized with heavy metal gates in an 
effort to privatize what was a public space, making it an apt focal point for civic protest as a space that 
had once belonged to the people but had now been secured by political and economic elites. As a 
group of about 100 students began to occupy Civic Square, a concentric circle of police surrounded 
them, intending to remove them from the space. By September 27, supportive fellow students and 
Hong Kong citizens (including Joseph Cardinal Zen) encircled the police and occupied the nearby 
Tamar Park to ensure the safety of the occupiers within Civic Square; in turn, the police refused to 
allow people into Civic Square, which prompted Scholarism’s Joshua Wong Chi-fung and HKFS’s 
Lester Shum to encourage citizens to jump the gates. As tensions escalated, Wong himself climbed 
the gates and was promptly arrested and detained for over 40 hours. Police pepper-sprayed other 
students who entered Civic Square, causing consternation among the surrounding crowds. As the 
crowd pressed in on the police on September 28, the police fired 87 volleys of tear gas and pepper-
sprayed more people. Some 100,000 Hongkongers then rushed down to the street, chanting, “Protect 
the students,” resulting in the physical occupation of not only roads near the government building in 
Admiralty, but further down Hong Kong Island in the commercial space of Causeway Bay. Student 
protesters also mounted a separate occupation of Mong Kok in Kowloon, a working-class area that 
had symbolic value because of its status as a site that belonged to the people. 
These autonomous, leaderless protests marked the end of OCLP’s influence on the civic conversation 
on civil disobedience. As the events of September 28 unfolded, OCLP also rushed in to capitalize on 
the occupations already happening outside of its control, controversially moving its start date back 
from October 1 to September 28 to conveniently coincide with the already-existing protests. In some 
ways, it was legitimate for OCLP to think that it should have had a say in the occupations; after all, 
the fact that some of the protesters came prepared with goggles, plastic wrap, and umbrellas suggested 
that they had read OCLP’s Manual for Disobedience, a text that OCLP had released on its website 
during the student strikes to instruct the protesters on the practicalities of civil disobedience, including 
what to wear to protect against police brutality and what their legal rights were if they were arrested. 
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However, OCLP’s suggestion that the new protests were equivalent to the civil disobedience acts for 
which the movement had planned caused a row with the students. After all, the students had enacted 
their strikes precisely because OCLP had been running out of steam; with OCLP coming back into the 
picture, some of the students accused OCLP of stealing their thunder. Adding to the confusion was the 
media coverage, which called all of the protests “Occupy Central” even though the occupations were 
not happening in the Central district. Although OCLP then clarified that it had only moved its start 
date to support the students, the students’ dissatisfaction with OCLP’s actions suggested that OCLP 
actually had little control over the new movement. Of course, this is also not to say that OCLP’s plans 
were all left unfulfilled: At the National Day celebration on October 1—the day that OCLP had 
planned to have its symbolic “banquet”—Scholarism students followed through with OCLP’s original 
plan, attending the National Day ceremony and then silently turning their backs on the flag-raising 
ceremony while making an “X” sign with their arms in an act of rejection against PRC sovereignty 
over Hong Kong. 
This new, leaderless protest was then termed the “Umbrella Movement.” Because the protesters had 
come somewhat prepared for police brutality with goggles, plastic wrap, and umbrellas, an 
international observer from France dubbed these protests the “#umbrellarevolution” on Twitter as 
early as the evening of September 26, a hashtag then picked up by the international media.44 HKFS 
leaders promptly corrected the record, calling the protests the “Umbrella Movement” because they did 
not intend to overthrow the government. But they adopted the terminology, naming the center of their 
Admiralty occupation site “Umbrella Square,” complete with a sculpture of “Umbrella Man” wielding 
a yellow umbrella next to a Lennon Wall with colorful post-it notes of encouragement for Hong Kong 
citizens to “add oil” and “fight to the bottom” for democracy.45  
In line with the forces that gave rise to democracy during the colonial era and that radicalized the 
post-1980s generation against the SAR government in the late 2000s, the Umbrella Movement’s 
occupations have revealed the collusions of the government with various private sectors, including the 
criminal underworld. On October 3, attacks on protesters in Mong Kok generated the accusation that 
the government was paying Triad societies to do their dirty work, launching a larger occupation. So 
too, a march in Admiralty on October 4 by anti-Occupy protesters wearing blue ribbons elicited 
reports that those opposing the protests were paid agitators. As tensions swirled, rumors that the 
government would use military force, a cipher for the People’s Liberation Army, led to increasing 
invocations of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, especially when the government suddenly cancelled the 
scheduled talks with the students for October 10. As the occupations swelled, frequent clashes among 
the occupiers, locals wearing surgical masks attacking the camps, and police using crowd-control 
tactics raised the specter of government collusion with the Triads. In one dramatic incident, the 
beating of Civic Party member Ken Tsang by police was filmed on TVB, which then censored the 
incident after broadcasting it, leading to complaints that the media was in collusion with the 
government and the criminal underworld. 
In response, religious shrines appeared in the occupation sites, enacting a supernatural dimension to 
the protests. Not only were Christian leaders visibly holding worship services, celebrating the 
Eucharist, and setting up street sanctuaries like St. Francis’ Chapel on the Street in Mong Kok, but a 
Guan Gong shrine appeared, invoking a Chinese deity worshipped by both the police and the Triads 
with an inscription to hex them for attacking the protesters. As these tensions grew, the government 
finally met with the students on October 21 with a team led by none other than now-Chief Secretary 
Carrie Lam, the same official who had made her mark negotiating with students at Queens’ Pier in 
2006. In a two-hour dialogue for which students came prepared with legal coaching, popular opinion 
turned toward the protesters, citing their valid legal objections to the undemocratic way that the 
political apparatus was operating. Indeed, there were plenty of accusations to be made about the 
government. After accusing the protesters of colluding with “foreign forces,” C.Y. Leung made a 
gaffe to the New York Times that universal suffrage would lead to low-income people voting for 
policies skewed toward them. As if it could not get worse, Leung was at this point also dogged by the 
Australian media’s accusations that he had a conflict of interest by owning shares in UGL, a company 
that sometimes participated in Hong Kong’s property market. 
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However, the Umbrella Movement also revealed internal strife among democracy activists, arguably 
leading to the collapse of the movement. With frustration that the protests were not yielding the 
achievable goal of universal suffrage, debates between radical protesters and the pan-democratic 
moderates began to surface. On November 19, a protest at the Legislative Council Complex turned 
into a disaster, with radical activists using violence to vandalize the building. This incident led to a 
sharp decline in popular support for the movement, scattering the democratic forces that had been 
united by acts of violence perpetrated against them. On November 25 and 26, bailiffs using a court 
order acquired by bus companies in Hong Kong cleared out the Mong Kok protests, arresting 116 
people, including Joshua Wong and Lester Shum. On December 1, Scholarism turned in its own 
radical direction, starting a hunger strike for democracy, while OCLP embarked on its own course of 
turning themselves into the police on December 3 in an effort to safeguard the rule of law. On 
December 11, police using a court order removed the Admiralty occupation, arresting 209 protesters, 
including HKFS members, Scholarism leaders, and a motley crew of pan-democratic legislators. The 
final occupation at Causeway Bay was evicted on December 15. 
However, the clearance of the occupations has not led to the demise of the Umbrella Movement. As 
early as November, People Power developed a concept called the “floating revolution,” a strategy to 
let the police clear the streets while protesters stood on the sidewalk, only to re-occupy the roads after 
the police leave. After the Mong Kok occupations were cleared in late November, the Mong Kok 
protesters remained, arguing to the police that they were merely shopping. This course of action has 
developed into what is known as the “Gau wu revolution,” Putonghua for “shopping,” as the 
protesters pretend to be PRC tourists participating in the consumption of the city. On Hong Kong 
Island, carolers—mostly Protestant Christian members of People Power associated with the socially 
engaged Narrow Church—appeared during the holiday festivities, revising Christmas song lyrics to 
reflect their desires for universal suffrage. When the Admiralty occupation was cleared, protesters 
made signs to generate the Twitter hashtag, #WeWillBeBack. Finally, on December 23, a 14-year-old 
girl was arrested at Admiralty’s Lennon Wall for drawing flowers next to umbrellas with chalk; when 
she was threatened with removal from her family into a child home, the social uproar led to her being 
freed on bail. 
The aftermath of the Umbrella Movement has been a tense stalemate. Since January 2015, radical 
democratic groups such as Civic Passion, Hong Kong Indigenous, and Frontline have turned their 
attention towards more provocative forms of protest, inciting weekly Sunday demonstrations against 
tourists from the PRC in the New Territories by arguing that they are part of a program of economic 
colonization from the PRC that is driving up the prices of food, property, and pharmaceutical products 
in Hong Kong. At the same time, the government has been actively seeking to suppress any further 
forms of protest; one seemingly benign outlet has been the Hong Kong Ideas Centre, a pro-
establishment third-party policy think tank that summarized its research in a report released on April 
13, 2015, arguing that the causes of social discontent among youth that led to civil disobedience was 
the lack of motivation among youth to pursue economic possibilities for themselves, including taking 
jobs in the PRC mainland.46 Meanwhile, the security apparatus of the Hong Kong police force has 
also been ramped up, with frequent social and mainstream media reports of random detainments on 
the streets of Hong Kong. On Chinese New Year in 2016, these tensions erupted into a violent clash 
when police fired live bullets into a crowd of street vendors and radical activists selling fishballs; the 
ensuing violence became dubbed the ‘Fishball Revolution,’ although this has not seemed to gather the 
momentum to launch a redux of the Umbrella Movement, at least not yet. Such post-Umbrella 
Movement civic tension demonstrations that if there is anything that has not been accomplished since 
the final occupations were cleared, it is a resolution. Indeed, the actions undertaken during the 
Umbrella Movement attempted to directly address the systemic issues we have seen in Hong Kong’s 
political apparatus, but because no concrete changes have been made, the problems remain, awaiting 
another moment of action in an uncertain future. 
Conclusion: Toward Theological Reflection on the Umbrella Movement 
What I hope to have shown in this primer is that the demands of the democratic movement in Hong 
Kong were not vague ideological missives. Instead, they were proposals to change the material 
conditions of Hong Kong that culminated in the 2014 Umbrella Movement. The central problem that 
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the Umbrella Movement tried to address was not so much the lack of political agency among Hong 
Kong’s populace, but rather that the British invention of “functional constituencies”—itself already 
problematic in the pre-1997 era—had been further co-opted by the post-handover government to tilt 
public policy in the favorable direction of the political and economic elites: property tycoons, the 
Beijing central government, and even the criminal underworld of the Triad societies. Seeking to take 
back political ownership of Hong Kong, the democratic movement has had a history of using mass 
protests and strategies to get themselves into the political apparatus in order to advocate for ordinary 
citizens as well as racial and sexual minorities. However, the ultimate goal has always been the 
abolition of functional constituencies in electing Legislative Council members and the Chief 
Executive, allowing the citizens of Hong Kong—including and especially the minority populations—
to advocate for their own interests instead of having to abide by the economic whims of the ruling 
class. The demand for democracy is thus a material demand for capital to be returned to the commons 
instead of being concentrated in the secretive coffers of the wealthy. 
Complicating this dynamic of liberative democracy is the “one country, two systems” framework in 
which Hong Kong SAR finds itself in relation to the PRC. Since the 1984 Joint Agreement and the 
post-1997 Basic Law, the SAR has been promised a “high degree of autonomy” despite its status as a 
territory under the sovereignty of Beijing’s central government. It must be stressed again that the 
problems here are concretely material. While Hongkongers in the democracy movement often protest 
against what they see as the Chinese colonization of Hong Kong culture, the material problem is that 
the market socialist framework of the PRC aligns the central government with the economic ruling 
class in Hong Kong, compounding the political, economic, and social inequalities that have already 
been fostered by the functional constituencies in the political apparatus. While the democratic 
movement in both its moderate and radical factions seeks a return of capital to the commons, the irony 
is that the actions of the central government—which purports to be socialist in its convictions about 
wealth distribution—in fact exacerbate the inequality of wealth, property, and political agency in 
Hong Kong.47 The tensions that have simmered since the British colonial period and have been 
heightened since the 1997 handover have now boiled over into the protest occupations of the 2014 
Umbrella Movement. 
Theological reflection on this pro-democratic climax in Hong Kong is necessary because Catholics 
and Protestants have historically been embedded in both the ruling class and its discontents, 
generating frequent social and political commentary  
about the place of churches in Hong Kong’s civil society. Put another way, theological reflection has 
always been part and parcel of public deliberation in Hong Kong; the public sphere is anything but 
secular because the actions of Christians both for and against the government are of vital public 
interest. Accounting for this phenomenon is the historical place of churches in the previous colonial 
establishment: The Roman Catholic Church and mainline Protestant denominations were instrumental 
as the arm of the British regime as they ran schools, hospitals, and social services, facilitating the 
entry of Christians into the political class and the frequently tacit support of churches for the existing 
establishment with regards to politics. However, I have also shown in this primer that Christians were 
also the ones who initiated democratic activities since the 1970s, resulting in significant theological 
reflection and contestation in Hong Kong since that time about religious engagements with the 
political apparatus. Christians have thus been divided about the Umbrella Movement, and as our 
contributors continuously reiterate, the participation of individual Christians of both Protestant and 
Catholic persuasions does not mean that institutional churches are engaged. This dialectic between 
individuals and institutions has also fomented discontent among those in the democracy movement, 
leading to the discussions of how the churches are in fact part of the establishment—which has to 
some extent been proven by the financial corruption scandals that have plagued evangelical 
megachurches and their celebrity members in recent years. 
The Umbrella Movement is thus a theological moment, a time of reckoning for the contradictions of 
religion as both embedded in and seeking to reform the political apparatus. In this primer, we have 
thus examined Hong Kong’s political apparatus closely, sorting out where exactly its dysfunctions lie 
in terms of channeling capital and political agency to the few rather than to the many. We have also 
seen that religious actors populate this political terrain significantly enough for their participation to 
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warrant theological reflection on the Umbrella Movement. In short, we have seen deeply into the 
subterranean labyrinths of the Umbrella Movement, peeling back the sensationalistic celebration of 
the fact that there were protest occupations in Hong Kong in order to come to an understanding of the 
systemic causes that necessitated them. With the clearing of the protest occupations in December 
2014, the question that now circulates in Hong Kong is what fresh actions the democracy movement 
and its various theological actors should take to demand the return of capital and political agency to 
the commons. After all, the exacerbated tensions that we now see in 2015 and 2016 suggest that the 
movement will be all but over until the apparatus has been altered in the directions of egalitarian 
wealth distribution and political agency for all. However, there is a step between seeing and acting: 
the political apparatus and the pro-democracy movement that we have seen must be theologically 
judged. Having now seen the apparatus and its discontents, the four theologians in this volume—Mary 
Yuen, Rose Wu, Lap Yan Kung, and Sam Tsang—will perform precisely that task of judgment in 
their theological reflections. To quote from a tradition that has yet to be more fully represented in 
Hong Kong’s democracy movement—the Byzantine Rite—we announce with the Divine Liturgy as 
the readings begin: “Wisdom! Let us be attentive!” 48  
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September 28, 2014, is usually considered the day that the theological landscape in Hong Kong 
changed. For 79 days, hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens occupied key political and 
economic sites in the Hong Kong districts of Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and Mong Kok, resisting the 
government’s attempts to clear them out until court injunctions were handed down in early 
December.1 Captured on social media and live television, the images of police in Hong Kong 
throwing 87 volleys of tear gas and pepper-spraying students writhing in agony have been imprinted 
onto the popular imagination around the world. Using the image of a student standing up all wrapped 
up in plastic wrap to protect against police brutality, the cover story of The Economist on October 4, 
2014, was titled “The Party v. the People,” attempting to analyze the Hong Kong protests’ impact on 
relations with Beijing. Not to be outdone, the Time magazine cover dated October 13, 2014, featured 
the image of a goggled young man with a face mask triumphantly holding up two umbrellas 
surrounded almost like incense with the smoke of the tear gas. On the front of the magazine is 
plastered three words, “The Umbrella Revolution,” declaring that Hong Kong’s youth were fed up 
with the lack of democracy in this Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). Gathering shortly thereafter in their newly formed Umbrella Square, the Hong Kong 
Federation of Students and Scholarism (a secondary school student movement led by the charismatic 
Joshua Wong Chi-fung, himself gracing the cover of Time the very next week on October 20) 
declared that this was not a revolution because they were not overthrowing the government.2 They 
asserted that the occupations were a movement—the Umbrella Movement—to demand that the 
government institute “genuine universal suffrage,” the right of citizens in Hong Kong to vote for 
candidates that they could directly nominate and who would not have to be vetted by the central 
government in Beijing. A series of debates circulated in the Umbrella Movement’s wake, wondering 
whether the protests constituted Hong Kong’s Tiananmen moment, hearkening back to the student 
democracy movement that had resulted in close to one million people occupying Beijing’s central 
public square in 1989, only to be violently suppressed with tanks, bayonets, and live bullets 
throughout the streets of the PRC’s capital on June 4.3  
Democracy, protest, solidarity, youth At face value, one might suppose that the Umbrella Movement 
is the birth of a kind of liberation theology in Hong Kong; certainly, that you are reading a volume 
attempting a theological reflection on the protests might evoke a sentiment of this sort. Indeed, one 
fascinating focal point of the constant media coverage of the Umbrella Movement was that Christians 
were not only involved, but heavily engaged in leading the spectrum of groups that composed the 
democracy movement.4 The official estimates of the actual number of Christians in Hong Kong, both 
Catholic and Protestant, has been at around a consistent 10 % of its population of seven million since 
the 1980s, suggesting that the significant influence of Christians on the Umbrella Movement—indeed, 
in a historical sense, on Hong Kong society—is not captured by sheer statistics.5 For example, Joshua 
Wong is an evangelical whose family has roots in the charismatic renewal movement. The leaders of 
the group that arguably brought about the civic awareness that catalyzed the movement in 2013, 
Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), boast a law professor of evangelical persuasion, Benny 
Tai Yiu-ting, and a Baptist minister, the Rev. Chu Yiuming. While the current cardinal-bishop of 
Hong Kong, John Cardinal Tong Hon, has been less than enthusiastic about the protests, his 
predecessor, Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-ken actively led the students out to the protest that resulted in 
the occupations. In the Mong Kok occupation, an ecumenical band of Christians—Roman Catholics, 
Anglicans, non-denominational evangelicals—built a makeshift sanctuary called St. Francis’ Chapel 
on the Street. Even those who criticize these leaders as overly bourgeois count among their number 
those who identify as Christian. The core of radical democratic political party People Power is a group 
known as Narrow Church, which is led by seminary students from Chung Chi Divinity School of the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). As a mentor to the radical democracy group Civic 
Passion, politician Raymond Wong Yuk-man is a baptized Christian who attends a socially engaged, 
liturgically innovative, non-denominational church in the working-class Shaukeiwan district. 
Certainly, there is something to be said here about how the arc of theology bends toward justice and 
liberation, engaged in solidarity with the demands of democracy as a way of solving social ills and 
political corruption. 
That the call for grassroots political agency has been key to many articulations of theologies of 
liberation in both Latin America and in Asia prompts the question of whether the Umbrella Movement 
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can be considered a moment of liberation theology in Hong Kong. Certainly, there are resonances 
with what theologians Joerg Rieger and Kwok Puilan call the “theology of the multitude,” the “rising 
up” of the ochlos (“a crowd or mass of people”) and the laos (“the common people”) against their 
rulers by invoking the in-breaking of the kingdom of God.6 Typical of academic theological 
reflection, though, the essays that have been included in this collection do not tell a simple story that 
is easily continuous with such theological trends, even though one of our authors, Lap Yan Kung, has 
certainly drawn inspiration in his work from the Peruvian theologian known as the founder of 
liberation theology, Gustavo Guttiérez.7 Indeed, the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council and the 
meeting of the Latin American bishops at Medellín, Colombia. in 1968 produced what we have come 
to call liberation theology and brought about the adoption of concepts such as “basic ecclesial 
communities,” the Second Vatican Council’s moniker of “the people of God,” the “see-judge-act” 
method, and the critique of unjust structures of domination through groups such as the Federation of 
Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC), minjung (“of the people”) theologians during the Park Chung 
Hee dictatorship of Korea in the 1970s, Dalit (“untouchable caste”) theology in the Church of North 
India in the 1980s, the People Power Movement in the Philippines, and the emergence of theologies 
from migrants and indigenous peoples within Asia.8 Yet the simple fact that there is a tradition of 
Asian liberation theology should not obscure the fact that the Umbrella Movement has its own 
theological genealogy, one that is not generically “Asian” or beholden to “theologies of liberation,” 
but that is rooted in the odd history of Hong Kong’s pre-1997 colonial relationship with the United 
Kingdom and its post-1997 arrangement with the PRC, in which it enjoys both legal autonomy and 
suffers a national identity crisis through the principle of “one country, two systems.” 
Indeed, the Chinese case is what makes the Umbrella Movement difficult to neatly conceptualize 
within the otherwise straightforward rubrics of liberation theology. After all, liberation theology has 
its origins in the critique of capitalist dictatorships that had allied themselves during the Cold War 
with the so-called “free world” of North American Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. This is not 
to say that liberation theology, contrary to popular opinion (as well as that of Joseph Cardinal 
Ratzinger’s Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith from the 1980s to the 2000s), is necessarily 
beholden to Marxist ideologies of class struggle and the agency of capital processes. Indeed, Paulo 
Freire’s influence on the “conscientization” of Latin American liberation theology is—as philosopher 
of education Sam Rocha and his students argue9 —perhaps better seen as a proto-evangelium for 
Medellín’s call for “‘conscientización’ ordered to changing the structures and observance of 
justice.”10 So too, theologies of solidarity with the minjung in Korea, the dalit in India, the people in 
the Philippines, and the migrant workers and indigenous peoples of Asia usually have more to do with 
the inculturation of Christian concepts than the ideological indoctrination of secular materialism.11 
However, the objection still stands: Most of these cases have to do with “liberation” from the un-free 
conditions of the free world. With the emergence of Chinese democracy movements such as the one 
in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the various protests that have riddled the Republic of China in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong SAR when a closer relationship with the PRC central government has been 
suggested, this is—strangely enough—liberation theology done in relation to a nation-state that for all 
intents and purposes still identifies with the now-defunct Soviet bloc of yesteryear.12  
The question of whether such geopolitical conditions qualify the protest movements as “liberation 
theology” is thus complex. Add to the mess the complexity following the Open Door Policy reforms 
of 1978 that opened the PRC to a platform of “market socialism,”13 and one hears political 
psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek joking that the PRC is really “totalitarian capitalism” more similar to the 
style of Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore than Mao Zedong in revolutionary China,14 what Marxist 
geographer David Harvey calls “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics” in a deliberate jab at 
then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s description of the post-reform era as a time of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.”15 On the one hand, the conditions of market reform do place the 
Chinese case, complete with its pretensions to “market socialism,” in square continuity with the Latin 
American and Asian cases. However, an intact communist government will still have the ideology 
that the expansion of its central government’s powers is a mode of liberation itself. In a stunning 
analysis by geographer Kean Fan Lim, “market socialism” may be nothing more than the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) slowing down its strategy to initiate the class struggle to bring in a 
communist utopia.16 Asserting sovereignty claims in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan 
 31 
 
 
can thus be understood from the CCP’s perspective as liberating these territories from the ideological 
work of capitalism, placing a damper on the glib usage of “liberation” to describe theologies that 
might be emerging from the participation of Christians in the Umbrella Movement. 
A better approach—one that we take in this book—is to perform thick descriptions of the concrete 
situation in Hong Kong as a distinct approach of doing theology, rooting our discussion not in the 
generic language of “Asian” liberation theology or evangelistic inculturation, but in the history, 
politics, and public spheres of Hong Kong itself.17 To be sure, such an approach is a direct application 
of Joseph Cardinal Cardijn’s see-judge-act method from the early twentieth-century Young Christian 
Workers movement in Belgium: one sees a sociological situation of injustice, judges it theologically, 
and takes action. Enshrined as the ecclesially sanctioned approach to social justice in Pope John 
XXIII’s 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra, see-judge-act has become a staple of theologies of 
liberation that have both been central to the implementation of Catholic social teaching and 
transcended their Roman origins.18 Yet keeping in mind the caveats for calling protest theologies 
“theologies of liberation” in Hong Kong, we ask for patience and understanding from our readers as 
we nuance the continuities and discontinuities of the Umbrella Movement from other movements that 
have gone before it. While a Hong Kong-specific “liberation” is certainly a theme that emerges from 
the essays, a more accurate description of the task we have set for ourselves is that we are trying to 
tell the story of Hong Kong through the Umbrella Movement from several different theological 
perspectives—Catholic solidarity, feminist theology, the theology of kairos, and biblical exegesis.19  
In terms of the steps of see-judge-act, we are reflecting retrospectively on an action that has already 
been taken, which means we are seeing and judging again afresh. We contend that this mode of place-
specific theologizing is valuable even for readers without a dedicated interest in Hong Kong, because 
our thick description advances an approach to theology that is emerging directly out of the Umbrella 
Movement. In this new method, the thick details of the political apparatus, the economic system, the 
sociological conditions, and the local culture matter a great deal for the task of doing theology in any 
place. To put it another way, we are mapping the “grounded theologies”—the “performative practices 
of placemaking informed by understandings of the transcendent”—emerging out of Hong Kong, 
describing the geographies of the Umbrella Movement through a variety of theological registers.20 
One could advance our approach in other new protest cultures in the world, be it the global Occupy 
Movement, the Arab Spring with its unintentional geopolitical production of the Islamic State and the 
tragic refugee crisis in Syria and Iraq, the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement 
against Israeli occupations of Palestinian territory, the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and the 
subsequent tensions on the Russia-Ukraine border, the African American #BlackLivesMatter 
movement in the USA, the Idle No More indigenous protests against settler colonialism in Canada, 
the Taiwanese Sunflower Movement against regional integration with the PRC, the Bersih movement 
in Malaysia calling for clean government, the protests in Caracas against Venezuelan economic 
policies and state-sponsored gendered violence, and the Mexican protest against state collusion with 
narcotics gangs recently given a new symbolic register by the brutal events in Ayotzinapa.21 The task 
of the theologian is thus to describe instead of prescribe, or, to put it in a less binary way, to let the 
thick description drive the suggestive prescriptions from the ground up. Who are the specific 
theological actors in each of these cases? In what geographical conditions are they operating? How do 
the lenses of different theologies shift the thick description of the same place, the same protest, the 
same political apparatus? How can these differing theological actors work together, what are they 
working toward in their own terms, and how are their objectives theological? 
In other words, we are using the Hong Kong case to highlight the specific theologies that the 
Umbrella Movement has engendered in the hope of spurring comparative scholarship to take on the 
thick description of protest, politics, and places as a mode of theological analysis. At this point, we 
need to be clear about our politics. We reject the idea that we should be neutral observers seeking a 
liberal overlapping consensus of every theological position on the Hong Kong protests. Indeed, 
critical scholars of secularization have repeatedly reminded us that the quest for political neutrality, 
especially in matters of faith is often its own position—and one usually allied with the modern state 
establishment’s political agenda to subjectify its citizens!22 During the Umbrella Movement, residents 
of Hong Kong wore three ribbon colors to distinguish their positions on the 2014 events: a yellow 
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ribbon denoted support for the student strikes that eventually led to the occupations, a blue ribbon 
symbolized opposition, and a green ribbon signaled an attempt at neutrality. In this schematic, all of 
our contributors would be classified as yellow-ribboners. 
We are quite untroubled and unapologetic about our politics for three key reasons. First, while we 
understand that theological actors in Hong Kong were rather divided on the Umbrella Movement, we 
also observe that the arguments against the occupations mostly rested on the need for the church to 
maintain the political and economic stability of Hong Kong as a global city. As several of our 
contributors suggest, this is not only a secular contention, but it fails the litmus test of commitment to 
the virtues of peace with justice and charity that are much more strongly identified with the protesters 
than with a government whose interests are tied to the private whims of property tycoons, PRC 
officials, and even the criminal underworld. Moreover, to speak in the key of liberation theology, we 
show that the skewed economic system in Hong Kong that funnels much of the capital and political 
agency to a colonizing ruling class necessitates what theologians of liberation have called a 
“preferential option for the poor,” a commitment to do theology from the perspective of those who 
have not as opposed to those who have. 
Second, we note that the hard-and-fast definitions of yellow versus blue versus green ribbons describe 
an ideological form that did not translate neatly onto the ground during the Umbrella Movement. It is 
true, on the one hand, that blue-ribboners led by figures such as Leticia Lee and Robert Chow often 
violently attacked the yellow-ribbon protesters; what is more, some of these attackers were discovered 
later to have been paid agitators. However, even those who wore blue and green were forced to 
participate in the movement because the protests consumed the city in an all-encompassing discussion 
about Hong Kong’s political future. On the ground, some of those who wore blue and green 
sometimes gently approached the camps to understand the motivations of the yellow-ribboners; in 
turn, some of those who wore yellow had to face families, friends, and churches that did not approve 
of their acts of civil disobedience. 
Third, and finally, there were various factions from moderate to radical that divided the yellow-
ribboners themselves. In fact, our book may be further criticized by participants in the Umbrella 
Movement for including perspectives that they may find too moderate or too radical, depending on 
their understanding of the splits within the movement. Again, we are unperturbed. The ideological 
lines do not account for the messiness of the protests, and we write these theological reflections not as 
a final word, but as the beginning of a new process of seeing, judging, and acting that will require 
further conversation and debate. As careful readers will observe, the four perspectives in this volume 
do not speak with one voice. While Rose Wu celebrates the individual Christians who participated in 
the movement, Mary Yuen and Lap Yan Kung call on the institutional churches to play their part. 
While Wu and Kung come from distinctive backgrounds in modes of liberation theology, Sam Tsang 
is critical of the word ‘liberation.’ Even as Yuen and Wu celebrate the movement, Kung and Tsang 
are reserved because they see the potential for a dark side as well. This is not a united front; it is a 
cacophony of voices in tension with each other, an attempt to be similar to the polyvocality of the 
leaderless Umbrella Movement itself. Because rebuttals and refinements were part of the deliberative 
process that so characterized the movement, we go beyond welcoming them—we are excited to be 
criticized, although we reserve the right to defend our various positions in subsequent publications as 
well. 
To facilitate that process, we begin with a primer on Hong Kong, which occupies the entirety of Part I 
of our book. In this chapter, I offer a detailed account of the specific political apparatus at work in 
Hong Kong. I argue that the devil is in the details when it comes to the politics of Hong Kong, with 
the subtext as the localist position in Hong Kong, that is, one can only understand the Umbrella 
Movement by understanding clearly the system that necessitated the occupations in the first place. 
The chapter is lengthy because I explain the concepts of “one country, two systems,” the corporatist 
system of elections with “functional constituencies” that preclude democracy while purporting to 
advance it, the ties between the establishment and the property elites, and the erosion of judicial 
autonomy in Hong Kong. I demonstrate that each of these supposedly secular political concepts has 
theological importance because Christians are actors in both the establishment and in the democracy 
movement. Before we embark on the theological reflection on a place, we must know the local 
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geography. Indeed, the remaining chapters in the book, which undertake direct theological reflection, 
presume knowledge of this first chapter as a baseline for understanding Hong Kong’s local politics. 
In Part II, four theologians from Hong Kong offer theological reflections on the Umbrella Movement. 
Staying true to the origins of liberation theology in Catholic social teaching, we begin with Mary 
Yuen’s account of the Umbrella Movement—or as she calls it, the “occupy movement,” as local Hong 
Kong people term the protests—through a mode of Catholic solidarity that has been embedded in the 
local Hong Kong culture. As a former staff member of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong’s Justice 
and Peace Commission and a scholar of Catholicism in Hong Kong in her own right, Yuen’s account 
highlights how the aspect of solidarity in Catholic social teaching is embedded in the protest 
occupations. What is notable about Yuen’s analysis is that she does not explicitly draw on the 
traditions of liberation theology within Catholicism. Instead—and perhaps unintentionally—she 
demonstrates that there is something that official Catholic teaching from the Second Vatican Council, 
the Catechism, papal statements, and episcopal conferences has to contribute to understanding the 
participation in the protests, including but not exclusive to Catholic youth participants. Indeed, she 
points out that the central contribution of Catholic social teaching is a focus on dialogue, a term that 
has often been used by Asian bishops to denote interreligious dialogue and thus positioning Catholic 
participation in the Umbrella Movement as encouraging interaction with an unjust government as if it 
were another religious system altogether. What emerges from Yuen’s grounded analysis is the sense 
that the work of liberation and solidarity is done in ways that confound the existing conventional 
binaries so often encountered in studies of lived religion and liberation theology between conservative 
adherence to official church teaching and a progressive rebellion against the ecclesial powers. It turns 
out that the official teachings of the church on social and political solidarity were used in powerful 
ways by actors in the occupy movement. 
While engaging with queer and feminist theory, Rose Wu’s chapter on the rebirth of Hong Kong 
through the Umbrella Movement maintains this consistent focus on ecclesial spirituality, although it is 
ultimately critical of the institutional church and seeks to revamp the power structures of Hong Kong 
in light of a new spirituality of solidarity from the protests. Wu’s contribution is valuable because she 
has been a tireless worker for women’s and sexual minorities’ rights both within the church and in 
civil society since the 1980s, notably convening the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) in 2002 to put 
underrepresented minorities on Hong Kong’s social map. Dubbing the Umbrella Movement a 
Pentecostal experience for Hong Kong, Wu performs a close reading of the empowerment that came 
about for racialized, gendered, and sexual minorities through the Umbrella Movement, suggesting that 
one of the emerging themes from the ground has to do with a changing sense of Hong Kong identity 
with deep resonances with the feminist theological concept of “interstitial integrity,” the intersectional 
stitching together of diversity to produce a radical sense of inclusive identity. In this way, though the 
movement’s major players consider themselves Christians of the most orthodox and even 
conservative varieties, they are knitted together with minority communities in Hong Kong that force 
them to always expand their sense of what Hong Kong identity includes. Wu thus contends that what 
has happened in Hong Kong should be understood as a new Pentecost, the literal birth of a new Hong 
Kong wrought by the eschatological coming of the Holy Spirit. 
Pulling back from overly celebratory interpretations of the Umbrella Movement, Lap Yan Kung, a 
liberation theologian at CUHK’s Chung Chi Divinity School who has long participated in the 
democratic movement in Hong Kong, uses his chapter to call churches in Hong Kong to evaluate the 
theological meaning of the protests, including the possibility that they might have ushered in a 
dialectical temporality that is as much about opportunity as it is about misfortune. Sharing Wu’s 
understanding that individual Christians played prominent roles in both OCLP and the Umbrella 
Movement, Kung’s approach differs from Wu’s muted disdain for churches that have not engaged 
with the movement by pointedly criticizing their theological rationales. He insists that Christian 
churches that seem reluctant to lend their institutional power to political engagement have no choice 
but to engage in reconciliation and dialogue in a Hong Kong divided precisely by what he sees as the 
emergence of disruptive form of time that would be called kairos in Greek. Indeed, kairos has been 
the subject of much heated debate in the wake of the Umbrella Movement, with some overly 
celebrating the revolutionary potential of the times while others insist that God has been silent about 
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Hong Kong politics. Kung’s intervention is that both readings of kairos are uncritical: one is overly 
celebratory, the other too passive. Instead, he acts as a critical theologian, performing a thick 
description of how the Umbrella Movement came to be and its complex relationship with its 
predecessor, OCLP. It is the political commentary and local description that drives Kung’s theological 
critique of kairos as both a time of opportunity and misfortune, which in turn is an explicit call for 
churches to participate with him in the work of critical theological reflection on the Umbrella 
Movement. 
Finally, Sam Tsang offers an exegesis of liberation in Hong Kong, further critiquing ecclesial 
practices of non-engagement by examining the sources of political action and apathy. Tsang is also a 
public figure in Hong Kong, known not only for his preaching and teaching as a seminary professor 
but also for his call to Protestant churches for integrity, most notably challenging evangelical 
megachurches on their ill-advised financial support for a hyped, celebrity-focused effort to find the 
historic Noah’s Ark in Turkey without paying attention to the requisite exegetical issues and the need 
for churches to reflect on the Hong Kong situation. Trained as a biblical exegete, Tsang reframes the 
analysis of the texts to pay attention to the “world before the text,” the situation in which theologians 
and exegetes use Scripture. For Tsang, “occupy Hong Kong” refers not so much to the Umbrella 
Movement, but to the colonial occupation of Hong Kong that he understands to be continuing under 
PRC rule. In this sense, the Umbrella Movement is about liberating Hong Kong from occupation 
through the co-optation of the word “occupation.” Understanding the meaning of “occupation” then 
becomes the standard by which Tsang measures the theologies that Kung as well as evangelicals 
associated with the Alliance Bible Seminary and the pro-establishment Anglican Archbishop Paul 
Kwong attempt to use to address the occupation of Hong Kong. The result is an examination of how 
figures like Kung and Kwong read the Bible with and against the democracy movement in Hong 
Kong, resulting in varying interpretations of the word “liberation” that have less continuity with 
trends in Asia and Latin America than with the definitions that are arising out of the ground in the 
Umbrella Movement. Demonstrating that an exegesis of the exegetes is critical because all reading is 
contextual, Tsang provides a survey of how theologians and exegetes have understood “occupation” 
and “liberation” in Hong Kong with concrete consequences for their position regarding the 2014 
protests. 
We end with an epilogue that ties the emerging themes of the Umbrella Movement together, with its 
redefinitions of liberation, exegesis, and solidarity. Reflecting on the doctrinal orthodoxy that was 
used to mobilize participants in the Umbrella Movement, we conclude that a faith that emerges as 
depoliticized in Hong Kong is in fact the resistance to the historic politicization of theology by the 
Hong Kong establishment in both the colonial and post-handover eras. The Umbrella Movement, we 
suggest, is thus, as Freire would say, a moment of “conscientization,” in which Hong Kong citizens 
became awakened to their political situation and were forced to reckon with it theologically. 
Following the see-judge-act matrix, what we hope that readers will take away is that it is important 
that we get the social science descriptions right even as we embark on theological reflection. Doing 
theology depends on a deep knowledge of political apparatuses, economic justice, theological 
traditions, and solidarity movements. Such theologies position the theologian as squarely on the side 
of the people, telling their stories and allowing grounded narratives to be juxtaposed in relation to 
various theological lenses. The result may well be something akin to the Umbrella Movement, a 
constellation of groups with no need for a clear leader fighting for democracy and justice strictly as a 
people telling the experts to either get with the program or to get out of the way.23  
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